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Introduction
Estelle Derclaye
The world (hi)story of the protection of designs1 has been extremely
diverse. It is so because of the special, hybrid, nature of such works: they
often combine utility and beauty so that it involves deciding whether to
protect the work only by design law or only by copyright law, or by both.
For over a century, legal systems, not only at national but also at regional
and international level, have struggled to ﬁnd themost adequate solution: a
single protection may be under- or overprotective and two or more can be
overprotective. The relationship or interface between copyright and design
law at regional and international level crystallised over the years because of
the entrenched and opposite positions (from minimal protection to max-
imal protection) the different countries have carried on taking on the issue.
Indeed, countries and periods when protection for designs changed can be
grouped in ﬁve different categories according to the type of interface
chosen: single protection by copyright law (i.e. no design law exists),
demarcation (i.e. no cumulation between copyright and design law), par-
tial cumulation, full cumulation and total cumulation.2 Furthermore, the
countries and periods with some cumulation can be subdivided between
those with rules and those without rules regulating the interface. In addi-
tion, the criteria to regulate the interface (in the main protection require-
ments, term of protection, authorship and ownership, infringement) vary
considerably among the cumulation countries along with the type of right
(anti-copying right or monopoly right). What’s more, the UK is evenmore
special as it is the only country in the world to have a national unregistered
design right along with very detailed rules regulating the registered and
unregistered design/copyright interface.
Since theDesignDirective was adopted in 1998, design applications from
all over the world have soared especially in Europe, the United States,
1 I use the ‘neutral’ term designs on purpose to include both works of applied art and
industrial designs. These terms are often used to demarcate the boundary between art (the
domain of copyright law) and industry (the domain of design law).
2 For a deﬁnition of these terms, see below.
1
SA
MP
LE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19867-8 — The Copyright/Design Interface
Edited by Estelle Derclaye 
More Information
www.cambridge.org© Cambridge University Press
Australia and Asia.3 EU and national case law on designs has increased as
well. Therefore, design law is no longer the ‘Cinderella’ of intellectual
property law it once was.4 Nevertheless, the interface between copyright
and design is still in disarray. Looking at the EU alone, the Design Directive
legislated very minimally on the interface as the EU legislature only required
the Member States to cumulate copyright and design laws without specify-
ing rules to regulate the overlap (art. 17 Design Directive, art. 96 Design
Regulation and art. 9 InfosocDirective). Subsequently,Member States have
in the main kept to their traditions, which means that some have full
cumulation and others partial cumulation between the two bodies of law,
with very different rules organising the interface or no rules at all. The recent
CJEU Flos judgment,5 which seemingly imposes the author’s own intellec-
tual creation level of originality for unregistered designs but leaves the level
of originality for registered designs toMember States, has created evenmore
uncertainty. Post Flos, some national courts still apply a higher level of
originality for unregistered designs (e.g. Germany, the UK and Italy). The
Flos decision also triggered the repeal of section 52 of theUKCopyright Act,
which organised the overlap between registered designs and copyright.6The
CJEUDonner decision also illustrates well the problems caused by the lack of
harmonisation relating to designs (furniture whose protection expired in
Italy parallel-imported in Germany where protection was still in force).7
Therefore, the current state of affairs is paradoxical – design protection is
gaining momentum but it is far from harmonious. Rules to regulate the
overlap between copyright and design law are badly needed, at the very least
at EU level. To ﬁnd the most appropriate rules, it is essential to review how
Member States’ and other relevant countries’ laws have organised the inter-
face in the past and how successfully (or not) they have dealt with it. It is only
by comparing national experience through history that an adequate solution
can be found.
The book has the triple aim of:
1 tracing the history of the design/copyright interface or in other words of
the protection of designs, of several countries, selected for their rules
regulating the interface, for their absence of rules or for their choice to
protect designs only by one body of law,
3 See WIPO statistics at http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/.
4 C.-H. Massa and A. Strowel, ‘Community Design: Cinderella Revamped’ (2003)
European Intellectual Property Review 68–78.
5 Case C-168/09, Flos SpA v. Semeraro Casa & Famiglia SpA [2011] ECDR 161.
6 For sharp criticism of Flos and the decision to repeal s. 52, see L. Bently, ‘The Return of
Industrial Copyright?’ (2012) EIPR 654.
7 Case C-5/11, Re: Donner [2012] ECDR 349.
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2 examining how these countries have coped with the problems engen-
dered by the rules they applied over the years and the reasons for
legislative changes,
3 in order to ﬁnd the most appropriate rules that can be used to regulate
the interface at EU level, and even at global level.
I recognise that it is ambitious to aim to ﬁnd such rules as it may not be
possible. But if these rules cannot be found, at least, the book will have
summarised the advantages and disadvantages of each system, allowing
for a better understanding of the interface. That said, in the ﬁnal chapter,
I propose what I think are achievable and workable rules to regulate the
copyright/design interface. I chose only ﬁfteen countries, namely, the
USA, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, the three countries that
form the Benelux, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Australia and
Japan, because they are among themost striking in terms of the copyright/
design interface. It is not necessary for the number of countries to be
bigger let alone exhaustive to achieve the desired result. In addition, there
must be sufﬁcient differences between countries and ample case law to
make the comparison worthwhile and interesting. Thus, for instance,
Malaysia and Singapore have followed the UK law closely (with only
very small differences) and have relatively little relevant case law. Thus
taking only the UK is sufﬁcient as it has a wealth of case law and is the
prime example as former colonies modelled their law on UK law. On the
other hand, Australia has departed from the UK relatively early and more
drastically and has an abundant case law. There is no EU chapter. This is
deliberate. Legislatively speaking, there is nothing to say as the interface
was left unharmonised. On the judicial front, we only have the Flos
decision but the judgment is obscure and by deﬁnition partial as con-
strained by the questions posed to the CJEU. Some commentators
address it in their chapters and, otherwise, much commentary has already
been written on the issue.8
The chapters only review substantive law, leaving procedural law (in
the main, design registration and remedies) aside. This is not to say that
no differences exist there but I had to work with a set word limit and the
line had to be drawn somewhere. Protection of designs by unfair compe-
tition laws is also not discussed. It could have been reviewed but it is not
8 E. Ventose, ‘ECJ Rules on Legislative Limitations on Copyright Protection for Designs in
Europe’ (2011) JIPLP 367; L. Bently, ‘The Return of Industrial Copyright?’; A. Tischner,
‘Focus on the Polish Regulation of Copyright and Design Overlap after the Judgment of the
Court of Justice in Case 168/09 (Flos v Semeraro)’ (2012) IIC 202; B. Lauriat, ‘Copyright
for Art’s Sake?’ (2014) EIPR 275; P. Masiyakurima, ‘Copyright in Works of Artistic
Craftsmanship: An Analysis’ (2016) OJLS 505–4; and literature cited at https://curia.europ
a.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7083/en/.
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necessary in order to ﬁnd the best rules to organise the interface. As I have
already explained in previous writings,9 it is sufﬁcient to say in this respect
that the overlap between slavish imitation and any intellectual property
right cannot be sustained when a speciﬁc right has been introduced
simply because the intellectual property right replaces the unfair compe-
tition action for slavish imitation in this case and that there is no problem
to cumulate the unfair competition action involving a risk of confusion
with an infringement of copyright or design rights as the two causes for the
actions (copying as opposed to causing confusion) are different.
That said, some chapters do discuss unfair competition law. This is
inevitable as contributors map the history of the interface and some
countries used unfair competition law instead of or in addition to copy-
right law before design protection existed (e.g. the Netherlands and
Greece). While it would be interesting and totally comprehensive to
examine the interface with trademark law, like with unfair competition
law, there was no space. Furthermore, in contrast with the copyright/
design interface, it is regulated at EU level, even if not fully, and is also
addressed in detail elsewhere.10
The chapters follow the same structure, except the ﬁnal chapter, which
analyses all the chapters and compares countries’ experiences in an
attempt to ﬁnd the most adequate rules to regulate the interface at inter-
national level. There is one chapter for all three Benelux countries,
focusing on Dutch law and the Uniform Benelux Law on Designs and
Models, one on all four chosen Nordic countries and two on US law, one
focusing on copyright, the other on design patents. The chapters start
with a table detailing the periods that the country has had in relation to the
way it has dealt with the interface. A country could have started with full
cumulation, then amended its law to adopt a partial cumulation system,
etc. The table lists the different acts the country has enacted in the ﬁeld of
protection of designs during these periods. The table also adds if courts
have followed or deviated from the legislature’s mandate (e.g. an Act
could have mandated demarcation but the courts applied cumulation).
For each period, the tables list the total and average numbers of designs
ﬁled and registered. This data is analysed in the last chapter and shows
that, in some cases, there is a link between the legal system chosen to
9 E. Derclaye and M. Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps: A European Perspective
(Oxford: Hart, 2011); E. Derclaye, The Legal Protection of Databases: A Comparative
Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008).
10 See E. Derclaye andM. Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps: A European Perspective; N.
Wilkof and S. Basheer (eds.), Overlapping Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012); R. Tomkovicz, Intellectual Property Overlaps, Theory, Strategies
and Solutions (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012); M. Senftleben, The Copyright/Trademark
Interface (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, forthcoming, 2017).
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regulate the copyright/design interface and the high or low number of
applications. Graphs drawn from WIPO and national IP ofﬁces data can
be found in the last chapter’s annex.
Each chapter then maps the history of the interface for the country or
countries in question, in short the evolution of the statutory and case law
on the protection of designs and the problems encountered over the years.
Many chapters dealing with EUMember States stop with the implemen-
tation of the Design Directive as even if their design law was amended to
comply with it, their law on the interface did not change. The chapters
analyse the success or failure, advantages and disadvantages of the various
mechanisms used in their countries to organise the interface over the
several periods and explain why the legislatures and/or courts changed
the rules over the years. Some then venture to conclude by giving their
opinion as to what the best rules regulating the interface could be.
All chapters follow the same terminology regarding the different sys-
tems elaborated to deal with the interface. The terms used are: demarca-
tion, partial cumulation, full cumulation and total cumulation. While
such terminology is very rarely used by legislatures11 or courts, many
commentators used similar terminology over the years and in different
countries, albeit not always consistently.12 Accordingly, we deﬁne the
several terms as follows:
Total cumulation: if the requirements of one law are fulﬁlled, there is
automatic protection under the other law and this is whether or not the
requirements of that other law are fulﬁlled. In other words, there is
assimilation of the protection requirements of one law with that of the
other. Among the countries reviewed in this book, this was the case only
in France between 1902 and the implementation of the Design Directive.
11 The European Commission’s Green Paper on the legal protection of industrial design
uses some of this terminology when it explains the different Member States’ systems
dealing with the interface.
12 Some commentators use the term ‘cumulation’ to describe total cumulation, e.g.
S. Ricketson and J. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne
Convention and Beyond, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 468;
W. Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’ (1978) 97 RIDA 4, 65. Some have
used ‘non-cumulation’ or ‘no cumulation’ to describe the situation we call demarcation,
among them S. Ricketson andU. Suthersanen, ‘TheDesign/CopyrightOverlap: Is There
a Resolution?’ in N. Wilkof and S. Basheer (eds.), Overlapping Intellectual Property Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 159; J. Reichman, ‘Design Protection After the
Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging InterimModels’ (1983) 31
J. Copyright Soc’y 267 and ‘Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976’ (1983)Duke Law Journal
1143 at 1169; Reichman (1983) Duke Law Journal 1143 at 1158 also uses the term
‘absolute’ to talk about what we call total cumulation.
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Full cumulation: both copyright and design right can subsist if the protec-
tion requirements are fulﬁlled and the two laws apply in tandem whether
it raises regime clashes and/or overprotection, or not. In other words,
there are no mechanisms in the legislation to deal with these problems.
Partial cumulation: both copyright and design right can subsist if the
protection requirements are fulﬁlled but either or both laws (i.e. the
Copyright Act or Design Act) has or have one or more mechanisms to
regulate the interface. For instance, if copyright and unregistered design
right both subsist and are infringed, theUKCopyright Act states that only
copyright infringement subsists (s. 236). Another example is alignment of
rules to avoid regime clashes, e.g. same authors and owners in both
copyright and design laws.
Demarcation: if something is protected or protectable by design law then it
cannot be protected by copyright or by unregistered design right or vice
versa.
Finally, the chapters in the book are ordered by type of system, starting
with total cumulation systems and ﬁnishing with demarcation systems.
Note, however, that most countries have changed systems over the years
and thus the countries’ place in the book reﬂects the longest period in
which they have retained the respective system.
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8 The Copyright/Design Interface in Italy
Estelle Derclaye*
8.1 Introduction
As Table 8.1 summarises, the copyright/design interface in Italy has
known two main periods, one of full cumulation (1865–1925) and the
second of partial cumulation (1925 onwards with a very brief interrup-
tion). However, in this second period, partial cumulation was based on
different criteria at different times. In the main, separability (scindibilità)
was used from roughly 1925 until 2001 with high consistency and legal
certainty albeit excludingmost three-dimensional designs, and from 2001
onwards, the criterion of artistic value took over that of separability, also
excluding many designs.1 Section 8.2 traces the history of the Italian
copyright/design interface from the ﬁrst copyright and design Acts of
the Italian state to the adoption of the Design Directive. Section 8.3
analyses the successes and failures of this history and draws conclusions
as to which period or system worked best, if any.
8.2 History of the Copyright/Design Interface in Italy
8.2.1 First Period: 1865–1925: Full Cumulation
The ﬁrst Italian Copyright Act dated from 1865 (Act of 25/6/1865 n.
2237) and the ﬁrst Design Act from 1868 (30/8/1868 n. 4578).2As can be
* I would like to thank Alessandro Cogo, Alberto Musso, Marco Ricolﬁ and Elisa Vittone for
their generous help answering questions andSabine Jacques,Giorgio Spedicato andVeronica
Villa for research assistance. I am also grateful for the support of the German Academic
Exchange Service (DAAD), which granted me funding to carry out research for this chapter
at the Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law.
1 For details especially on the last period, see P. Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a
well-designed product: Italy and its copyright protection of industrial design’ (2014) 240
Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 119 at 219–25.
2 There were copyright and design laws before these, but as they pre-dated the modern
Italian state, they are not reviewed here. N. Stolﬁ,La Proprieta Intelletuale, 2nd edn (Turin:
UTET, 1915), p. 185; G. Valeri, Corso di Diritto Industriale: Anno Accademico 1928–1929
(Firenze: Poligraﬁca Universitaria, 1929); M. Fabiani, Modelli e Design Industriali
(Padova: Cedam, 1975), p. 9.
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expected for copyright laws at the time, the ﬁrst Italian Copyright Act was
rather laconic. It protected all works of the mind and gave their authors a
right of reproduction (art. 1).3 The Act did not spell out a list, even
exemplative, of protected works. If a work was jointly created, there was
a rebuttable presumption that all co-authors had an equal part and could
exercise the right fully (art. 5). The right lasted the life of the author and
forty years after his or her death or eighty years from ﬁrst publication.4
The rights could be alienated (art. 15) and reproducing the work without
the author’s consent was infringement (art. 29). The Act did not establish
an infringement test nor were there provisions on protection require-
ments, employee works, commissioned works or limitations to the exclu-
sive rights. However, it was accepted that it was the designer who was the
owner ab initio of the copyright.5
The 1868 Act on industrial designs and models was inspired by the
French Act of 18/3/1806.6 It had just eight articles. Apart from these
articles, it referred to the Acts on industrial property rights of 30/10/
1859 n. 3731 and 31/1/1864 n. 1637 and the Royal Decree of the
same day n. 1674. This meant that designers had to follow the same
procedure as that of inventors. In view of the silence of the Act, the
literature agreed that ornamental designs and models could be two-
or three-dimensional.7 The 1868 Act referred to the protection
requirements for inventions but the literature disagreed on the mean-
ing of this.8 According to article 3 of the 1859 Patent Act, novelty
meant ‘never known’ or ‘when known there was ignorance as to the
particular means to actually make the invention’. Some commenta-
tors disagreed that novelty equated with originality in the sense of
original presentation of existing elements.9 Otherwise, commentators
interpreted the Act as requiring two types of novelty. Intrinsic novelty
meant originality or priority of the invention while extrinsic novelty
meant that there was no divulgation before the ﬁling of the design or
model. Thus it was not an absolute novelty. Even insigniﬁcant
changes could modify the design’s aspect and make it new.10
3 Articles 2 and 3 listed the different modes of reproduction, which included representa-
tion, adaptation, etc.
4 U. Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p. 208.
5 L. Di Franco, Trattato della Proprieta Industriale (Milan: Societa Editrice Libraria, 1933),
p. 241.
6 Fabiani,Modelli e Design Industriali, p. 9.
7 A. Spallino, ‘Rassegna di dottrina in tema disegni e modelli industriali 1883–1953’
(1954) Riv. Dir. Industriale 276 at 277.
8 Some commentators also thought that a criterion of industriality was necessary. See Di
Franco, Trattato della Proprieta Industriale, p. 216.
9 Spallino, ‘Rassegna di dottrina in tema disegni e modelli industriali 1883–1953’, 278.
10 Di Franco, Trattato della Proprieta Industriale, pp. 228–30.
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Likewise, a new application of a known design could be new.11
Designs contrary to laws, morality and public security could not be
protected (art. 6 of the Patent Act 1859).
The patent and design Acts were silent on ownership when the inventor
or designer was an employee. It was possible to transfer the design or
model in whole or part, according to the general property rules.12 The
transfer was only valid towards third parties if it was registered at the
intellectual property ofﬁce.13 The designer obtained an exclusive right to
reproduce the design in whole or part by any means (art. 2 of the Design
Act). The right lasted just two years from the day of publication and it
ceased if the designer had not made use of the design within a year of
publication (art. 4 of the Design Act). There were no limitations or
exceptions to the exclusive right.
Therefore, the Italian systemwas one of full cumulation.14However, as
early as 1905, E. Piola Caselli, the father of the separability doctrine (the
so-called scindibilità), which came to be adopted later by courts and then
the Italian legislator (see sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3), was already advocat-
ing the non-cumulation between copyright and design laws.15 For him,
for a work of applied art to remain protected by copyright, it had to keep
artistic individuality even if it had practical use. On the other hand, if the
aesthetic element was an integral part of the product, the work could only
be protected by the Design Act.16
The vast majority of commentators thought that the Design Act was
very defective owing mainly to the right’s short duration.17 This state of
fact was reﬂected in the very low numbers of designs applied for. In the
ﬁrst ten years of the Act’s application (1869–78), only ﬁve designs were
11 Valeri, Corso di Diritto Industriale: Anno Accademico 1928–1929, p. 182.
12 Di Franco, Trattato della Proprieta Industriale, p. 257. 13 Ibid.
14 E. Piola Caselli, Del Diritto d’Autore Secondo la Legge Italiana Comparata con le Leggi
Straniere (Turin: Marghieri, 1907), p. 297 citing Amar. Greco, Rotondi, Ghiron, Valeri
and Messineo also recognise the autonomy of ornamental designs and models and
extracted them from the scope of copyright, giving them the same rights as those of
inventors of patented inventions. However, some authors negated the autonomy of orna-
mental designs andmodels, saying that they were only protected by the Copyright Act: e.g.
Di Franco, Trattato della Proprieta Industriale and ibid., ‘Nozione teorica e disciplina legale
dell’arte applicata all’industria’ (1940) D. Aut. 269. On this, see Spallino, ‘Rassegna di
dottrina in tema disegni e modelli industriali 1883–1953’, at 282–3.
15 E. Piola Caselli, ‘Le opera d’arte applicata e il diritto d’autore’, Estratto del Foro Italiano,
Anno XXX, Fasc. III, p. 8, Citta di Castello, 1905. See also Piola Caselli, Del Diritto
d’Autore Secondo la Legge Italiana Comparata con le Leggi Straniere, p. 299.
16 Piola Caselli, Del Diritto d’Autore Secondo, pp. 299–300.
17 Ibid., p. 293. One commentator even mentions that no other country had such a short
term of protection: G. Bertolini, I Disegni e Modelli di Fabbrica: Tesi per l’Esame di Laurea
in Giurisprudenza (R. Università di Torino, 1914), p. 127. Another defect was the high
registration fee. See F. Foà, ‘De la protection des arts décoratifs en Italie’ (1902) I diritti
d’autore 125.
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deposited.18 Therefore, the courts did not have much to decide either.
Supposedly only one case arose out of the Act.19 In this case, the Court of
Appeal of Milan rejected protection to a sugared almond’s design having
the shape of a button for lack of novelty (controversially, though, as it was
the application of a known design to a new product, which all commenta-
tors agreedwas sufﬁcient for novelty).20Therefore, the gapwas ﬁlled by the
Copyright Act, which protected all works of the mind.21 Nonetheless, the
few decisions dealing with a work of applied art in that period held that they
were not protected.22 In a 1914 decision, the works in question were
bronze street lamps. The Court of Appeal of Milan held that for them to
be protected by copyright, they had to conserve their artistic individuality,
independently from the use they can have in practical life. The court found
that even if the lamps had an ornamental and artistic aim, they were not
works which could live independently from the industrial product and thus
were not artistic works.23 This 1914 decision thus already embraced the
separability doctrine advocated by Piola Caselli.
8.2.2 Second Period: 1925–1941: Full Cumulation in Theory
but Partial Cumulation in Practice – Adoption of the Separability
Doctrine
This period saw two new Acts: the Copyright Act 1925 and the Design
Act 1940. As early as 1906, the legislator wanted to reform the Design
Act.24 As a matter of fact, a new Act was adopted in 1934 but never came
into force.25 This Act already stated that the Copyright Act’s provisions
were not applicable to designs and models, thus incorporating the separ-
ability doctrine and codifying the case law and literature.26 It is only in
18 Foà, ‘De la protection des arts décoratifs en Italie’, p. 125. See also Table 8.1.
19 Foà, ‘De la protection des arts décoratifs en Italie’, p. 125.
20 CAMilan, 17/9/1889,Biancotti v.Gabutti,Mon. Trib., 1889, p. 891. See alsoG. Sala, ‘La
prima sentenza italiana in materia di designi e modeli industriali’ (1952) Riv. Dir.
Industriale 388–90.
21 The ﬁrst decision to clearly state that works of applied art were protected by copyright
was Cass. Turin (sic), 21/11/1903, Sirven v. Coen and Carli e De Carolis, Il Foro Italiano,
1905, p. 171.
22 CA Milan, 17/9/1914, Il Foro Italiano, 1914, p. 542 (lamp). See also CA Turin, 20/7/
1894, Il Foro Italiano, 1894, p. 394 in which the court held that once the author extracts
the aesthetic aspect of a work and uses it to decorate an object, copyright protection
ceases and only the industrial property protection can apply.
23 It also did not help that most of the designs were in the public domain.
24 Bertolini, I Disegni e Modelli di Fabbrica: Tesi per l’Esame di Laurea in Giurisprudenza, pp.
128–44.
25 Royal Decree of 13/9/1934 n. 1612, arts. 66–73.
26 V. De Sanctis, ‘I disegni e modelli ornamentali nella legge di riforma delle privative
industriali e dei marchi’ (1934) D. Aut. 482 at 484.
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1940 that the newDesign Act, with rules similar to the aborted 1934 Act,
came to see the light of day. Since the next Copyright Act dates from
1941, we will examine the Design Act 1940 during the third period.
The Copyright Act of 7/11/1925, n. 1950, made very few substantial
changes. Article 1 of the 1925 Copyright Act stated that all works of the
mind were protected whatever their merit or destination and its second
paragraph speciﬁcally included works of applied art. The rest remained
almost unchanged, except that the termwas increased to ﬁfty years p.m.a.
Like the previous Act, there were no provisions on protection require-
ments, employee works, commissioned works or limitations to the exclu-
sive rights. Thus full cumulation was still applicable as per the legislation
and favoured by most commentators.27 However, as we saw in the pre-
vious section, before the new Copyright Act of 1925, Italian courts and
commentators had started to drift from the unity of art approach to a
partial cumulation system, using the separability test. In fact, both the
courts and the literature elaborated several theories to determine under
which conditions works of applied art could be protected by copyright,
slowly but surely paving the way to a partial cumulation system. There
were no less than six different theories,28 namely means of reproduction
(if made industrially or in a high number of copies, the work cannot
obtain copyright protection),29 destination30 (if the work’s essential des-
tination is aesthetic then it can be protected by copyright and vice versa),
the accessorial character that the design or model may have in relation to
the industrial product, the level of artistic content, the author’s intention
or aim31 (art is created without aim whereas a design is a creation with an
aim, e.g. a mural as opposed to coins, stamps and labels) and the pre-
valence of the work’s artistic character. The prevailing theory was that of
artistic character – one must consider whether the artistic aspect prevails
27 Valeri,Corso di Diritto Industriale: Anno Accademico 1928–29; De Sanctis, ‘I disegni emodelli
ornamentali nella legge di riforma delle privative industriali e dei marchi’. See also Stolﬁ
cited by E. Piola Caselli, Trattato del Diritto di Autore e del Contratto di Edizione nel Diritto
Interno Italiano Comparato col Diritto Straniero, 2nd edn (Turin: Marghieri, 1927), p. 106.
28 Di Franco, Trattato della Proprieta Industriale, pp. 218–23 (he lists the different theories).
See also L. Biamonti, ‘La protezione pratica delle opere dell’arte applicata, Rapporto
presentato al congresso di Budapest dell Ass. Litter. et Art. Internazionale del 1930’
(1930) D. Aut. 563; Fabiani,Modelli e Design Industriali, pp. 24–6.
29 L. Biamonti, ‘Sulla natura e sui limiti della tutela giuridica dei lavori d’arte applicata
all’industria e dei disegni e modelli ornamentali’ (1932)D. Aut. 457 highlighted the ﬂaw
of the separability doctrine and favoured this theory to complement it.
30 M. Ghiron, Corso di Diritto Industriale con Testi di Legislazione e Convenzioni Internationale
in Appendice (Roma: SEFI, 1929), Vol. II, p. 210.
31 Biamonti, ‘La protezione pratica delle opere dell’arte applicata, Rapporto presentato al
congresso di Budapest dell Ass. Litter. et Art. Internazionale del 1930’, p. 563.
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over the industrial one.32Only if the utilitarian function can be separated
from the artistic one can the design be protected by copyright. This was
also known as the separability theory or doctrine. It is not an artistic value
criterion. As Marzano puts it, the test was ‘a sort of “conceptual reverse
engineering” aimed at verifying the persistence in the work, once applied
to a useful article, of the characteristics possessed by a corresponding
work of “pure”, non-applied art’.33 This theory won in the end. As
already mentioned, it had been elaborated by E. Piola Caselli in the ﬁrst
twenty years of the twentieth century, was gradually adopted by courts
and culminated in its adoption in the 1941 Copyright Act.34 This came
rather unsurprisingly as Piola Caselli was a judge at the Italian Supreme
Court during the period preceding the adoption of the 1941 Copyright
Act and then senator and rapporteur of the Copyright Bill. There was
therefore a discrepancy between the literature and the case law on the one
hand and the Act on the other. Some commentators also lamented that
the copyright’s term was too long for industrial designs and the Design
Act one was too short.35
In the 1930s, the judiciary adopted and then devotedly applied the
separability doctrine. The ﬁrst Supreme Court (Court of Cassation) deci-
sion which adopted the separability test dated from 1931 and involved a
stove. The court rejected the protection of the stove as a work of applied art
32 DiFranco,Trattato della Proprieta Industriale, p. 228;M.Ghiron,Corso di Diritto Industriale,
I marchi, i Segni Distintivi e le Insegne, le Invenzioni, i Modelli ed i Disegni Industriali, 2nd edn
riveduta ed ampliata (Rome: Società editrice del ‘Foro Italiano’, 1937) XII, 422, p. 387;
Biamonti, ‘Sulla natura e sui limiti della tutela giuridica dei lavori d’arte applicata all’in-
dustria e dei disegni e modelli ornamentali’, p. 443 and De Sanctis, ‘I disegni e modelli
ornamentali nella legge di riforma delle privative industriali e dei marchi’, p. 482 (who
admits the double protection by copyright and design law, in the case in which the works of
applied art can also have the aspect of works of pure art); A. Musatti, ‘Opera del ingegno e
disegni o modelli di fabbrica’ (1915) II Riv. Dir. Comm. 1164.
33 Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-designed product’, p. 121.
34 For a detailed description of the separability theory, see E. Piola Caselli, Trattato del
Diritto di Autore e del Contratto di Edizione nel Diritto Interno Italiano Comparato col Diritto
Straniero, 2nd edn, p. 109 and ‘L’allacciamento della protezione dell’arte industriale con
la protezione del diritto d’autore’ (1940) 1–2 D. Aut. 15. Other proponents of the
exclusive application of the Design Act for industrial designs included: M. Ghiron,
Corso di Diritto Industriale con Testi di Legislazione e Convenzioni Internationale in
Appendice, p. 213; ibid., ‘Disegni industriali ed opere artistiche alla prossima conferenza
di Roma’ (1928) Riv. Pol. Econ. l at 3; Biamonti, ‘Sulla natura e sui limiti della tutela
giuridica dei lavori d’arte applicata all’industria e dei disegni e modelli ornamentali’,
445ff; A. Giannini, ‘La protezione delle opere d’arte applicata all’industria’ (1939) Riv.
Pol. Econ. 939 at 950. See F. Morri, ‘Le opere dell’industrial design tra diritto d’autore e
tutela comemodelli industriali: Deve cambiare tutto perché (quasi) nulla cambi?’ (2013)
Riv. Dir. Indus. 177 at 185.
35 Biamonti, ‘La protezione pratica delle opere dell’arte applicata, Rapporto presentato al
congresso di Budapest dell Ass. Litter. et Art. Internazionale del 1930’; De Sanctis, ‘I
disegni e modelli ornamentali nella legge di riforma delle privative industriali e dei marchi’.
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in copyright law on the basis of the separability test as well as for absence of
originality, which it deﬁned as ‘an intellectual creation which reveals the
personality of the author’.36The Court of Cassation laid down the criterion
of separability as follows: ‘the industrial product which, because of its
nature, cannot be separated from a certain shape matching also with aes-
thetic lines, can be an artistic entity in as much as the artistic attitudes
extrinsic to the making of the object can be dissociated from it and from its
industrial destination and assume an autonomous depiction which is added
to the object’. A year later the Supreme Court restated its theory but here
found that the works were protected. The works were wooden ﬁgurines
representing ordinary people from the Val Gardena, which were added on
top of corks andwhich had the possibility ofmoving via amechanism.37The
court also conﬁrmed that the fact that the ﬁgurines were made industrially
did not affect their copyrightability. The Supreme Court then conﬁrmed
two decisions which, using the separability doctrine, had held two-dimen-
sional works unprotectable, namely typefaces38 and the design at the back of
playing cards.39As regards the latter, theCourt ofCassation agreedwith the
Court of Appeal that any playing cards need to have a design at the back and
the author’s aim is to make the industrial product more attractive in order
for it to be commercially successful. Several decisions from courts of appeal
and of ﬁrst instance also endorsed the doctrine.40Of note are two from the
Court of Appeal of Milan. One found that an advert was not protectable by
copyright for lack of separability and of originality41 and the other that
fashion sketches were protected by copyright as works of pure art.42
36 Cass., 19/12/1931 and 26/1/1932, Soc. Italiana Triplex v.Ditta Galimberti, Il Foro Italiano,
1932, 868; D. Aut. 1931, p. 129. One of the judges in this case was Piola Caselli.
37 Cass., 25/1/1933,Riffeser v.Comploy,Riv. Dir. Comm, pp. 208–12, aff’ingCABrescia, 12/12/
1933, Riv. della Prop. Intell. ed Indus, 1933, p. 324, also published in D. Aut. 1934, p. 46.
38 Cass., 20/12/1937, Fonderia tipograﬁca De Luca v. Ditta Schriftguss, Il Foro Italiano,
1938, 562.
39 Cass., 10/6/1938,Ditta Pignalosa v.DittaModiano, Il Foro Italiano, 1938, 1642, on appeal
from CA Naples, 9/7/1937, Il Foro Italiano, 1937, 1404.
40 See e.g. CA Milan, 31/12/1937, unpublished (bed) cited by L. Pavanello, ‘The protec-
tion of industrial design under Italian law’, in B. Gray and E. Bouzalas (eds.), Industrial
Design Rights: An International Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), p. 160.
41 CAMilan, 17/7/1933, Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico E. Granelli v. Zanoni, Riv. Propr.
Intell. ed Indus, 1933, p. 298, also published inD.Aut. 1934, p. 39. The advert in question
was a panel in wood in the form of a parallelepiped on which were placed on the left a box
of San Pellegrino magnesium and on the right a glass with water in it. At the top there was
a spoon in wood in which the magnesium was poured into the glass. The spoon was ﬁxed
by hooks on the panel. Then there were the words ‘Magnesia S. Pellegrino’ and ‘it is a
spoon of health’. For the court, no one withminimal taste and common sense would want
to acquire the work for his home, nor appreciate or contemplate it for its artistic value
independently from its advertising aim.
42 CAMilan, 22/10/1935, Est. Isoldi S.A.R. ed. E. Heimann v. Casa Editrice Aracne, D. Aut.
1936, 44.
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Thus, by the end of the period, the separability doctrine was well
established and accepted in Italian case law and literature.
8.2.3 Third Period: 1941–1996: Partial Cumulation and Demarcation
for 3D Functional Objects
The new Design Act was adopted on 25 August 1940 and the new
Copyright Act on 22 April 1941. During this period, there were two failed
attempts at changing design law. First, at the end of the 1970s, a new
design Bill added one more year of protection (i.e. ﬁve years) but did not
change much else.43The second attempt (theMinervini Bill of 29March
1984) aimed at unifying the regulation of industrial design in one single
Act, though still rejecting cumulation.44 Finally, an Act was adopted to
lengthen the duration of the design right to ﬁfteen years from ﬁling (Act n.
265 of 23/5/1977).
Apart from its codiﬁcation of the separability doctrine in its article 2(4)
which read ‘[i]n particular the following shall be protected: works of
sculpture, painting, drawing, engraving and similar graphic arts, includ-
ing scenic art, even when such works are applied to an industrial product
if their artistic value is distinct from the industrial character of the
product with which they are associated’, the Copyright Act 1941 in
substance did not change much; it was just more detailed on the rights
and added exceptions to the rights.
Article 1 of the Copyright Act 1941 stated: ‘[i]ntellectual works having
a creative character and appertaining to literature, music, the graphic arts,
architecture, the theatre and cinematography, whatever their mode or
form of expression, shall be protected according to this Law’. The words
‘whatever the merit or destination’ which appeared in the previous
Copyright Act were deleted to avoid protecting trivial works45 and
replaced by ‘whatever mode or form of expression’. The Act required
two protection requirements, namely creative character and intellectual
effort (arts. 1 and 6).46The author was the initial owner (art. 6) and there
43 On this see M. Rotondi, ‘Un progetto di legge tipo per brevetti, modelli e marchi e
proposta di una legge tipo in materia di diritto di autore’ (1977) 1 D. Aut. 89.
44 On this Bill, see G. Floridia, ‘La protezione del diritto di autore sulle opere dell’industrial
design’ (1984) I Riv. Dir. Ind. 372; M. Fabiani, ‘La protezione dell’arte applicata e
dell’industrial design in Italia e negli USA’ (1986) D. Aut. 414.
45 M. Fabiani, ‘Problemi di protezione del design industriale’ (1972) D. Aut. 265 at 270;
Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-designed product’, p. 145.
46 For most courts and commentators creative character referred to originality in the sense
of the author’s personality and not novelty. Contra: M. Franzosi, ‘Arte e diritto’ (1977)
Riv. Dir. Ind. 285.
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could be joint ownership (art. 10 and arts. 1100–1116 civil code).47 The
Act was silent on employee works, so contract law was applicable. The
general rule was that the works made by employees belonged to
the employee even if created during the course of employment. But the
courts sometimes ruled that economic rights were implicitly transferred
to the employer.48 There were also no rules for commissioned works. In
general, the copyright vested in the author unless there was a contract to
transfer the right to the commissioner49 and the transfer was only valid ‘to
the extent that it [was] necessary to fulﬁl the purpose of the commission-
ing agreement’.50Transfers needed to be inwriting (art. 110) and transfer
of future copyright was allowed under certain conditions.51 Economic
rights (reproduction, communication to the public, etc.) were provided
for in articles 12–19 and moral rights in articles 20–24. There was infrin-
gement even if there were small differences between the work and the
infringing copy. What was important was that the essential creative char-
acteristics of the ﬁrst work were recognisable in the subsequent work and
the judge did not have to examine the quality and quantity of all the differ-
ences and similarities.52 A few exceptions and limitations were provided in
articles 65–71. The term of protection was ﬁfty years p.m.a. (art. 25).
As in the previous Design Act, article 1 of the new Design Act of 25/8/
1940, n. 1411, provided that the Patent Act of 29/6/1939, n. 1127,
applied to ornamental designs, except for the provisions expressly stated
in the Design Act. Article 5 of the Design Act stated that ‘can be regis-
tered as ornamental designs and models the new models and designs
which can give, to industrial products, a special ornament, either by the
shape or the combination of lines, colours or other elements. The provi-
sions of the Copyright Act are not applicable to such designs andmodels.’
The second paragraph of article 5 did not mean that the protection of
the Copyright Act and the Design Act could not be cumulated. There
could be cumulation if the provisions of the two Acts were fulﬁlled. In
other words, it meant that the provisions of the Copyright Act could not
47 Cass., 29/4–29/7/1957, Ditta Fontanini v. Giardini, D. Aut., 1958, p. 72 (if a work is
created by several persons, all of themmust have contributed to the characteristics of the
indistinguishability and inseparability which are required by law in order to have copy-
right protection).
48 Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 214. Contra: Pavanello, ‘The protection of
industrial design under Italian law’, p. 165; the majority opinion was that economic
rights belonged to the employer, at least those rights that the parties intended to transfer,
citing Trib. Milan, 22/5/1972 (1972) D. Aut. 315.
49 Cass., 27/5/1957, D. Aut., 1957, p. 378.
50 Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 214, citing Cass., 7/6/1982, D. Aut., 1983, p. 23.
51 Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 215.
52 Cass. 1st civ., 5/7/1990, n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a. v.Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a.,D. Aut.,
1991, at p. 69.
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apply to registered designs but only the Design Act’s provisions could; in
other words, copyright protection did not apply to objects actually regis-
tered as ornamental designs or models.53
Designs had to be new, have industrial application54 and be lawful.55
Again, the Act did not deﬁne novelty and the literature and courts carried
on requiring the twin concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic novelty.56
Intrinsic novelty now meant more precisely a new creative contribution
which gives the object a special ‘ornament’, i.e. an autonomous aesthetic
or decorative value by the shape, a particular combination of lines, col-
ours or other elements.57 Thus a new form (fulﬁlling the requirement of
extrinsic novelty) could not be protected if anyone could create it without
individual creative effort (intrinsic novelty). For the majority of commen-
tators, novelty was relative, unlike in patent law.58 It was sufﬁcient that
the design ormodel consisted in a different form from that already applied
to analogous products, without pretending to be different from all forms
53 Fabiani commenting on Cass. 1st civ., 5/7/1990, n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a. v. Manifattura
Naj Oleari S.p.a., D. Aut., 1991, p. 70, also citing Greco e Vercellone, ‘Le invenzioni e i
modelli industriali’, in Trattato Vassali (Torino, 1968), p. 405; V. De Sanctis, Il carattere
Creativo delle Opera dell’Ingegno (Milan: Giuffrè, 1977), p. 100.
54 The requirement of industrial application of the design or model is the one referred to in
article 12 of the Patent Act 1939. For Fabiani, ‘Problemi di protezione del design indus-
triale’, pp. 277–8, industrial application is not a reproducibility of thedesign ormodel as pure
aesthetic creation but the adaptability of the model to the product object of industrial use,
with the aim to confer to it a ‘special’ ornamental character. For Suthersanen,Design Law in
Europe, p. 221, industrial applicability means reproduction by mechanical means and also
adapting the design to an industrial product for decorative purposes. ForG.Guglielmetti,Le
invenzioni e modelli industriali dopo la riforma del 1979 (Turin:Utet, 1982), p. 191, industriality
is implied in the destination of the industrial products.
55 Pavanello, ‘The protection of industrial design under Italian law’, p. 165; Fabiani,
Modelli e Design Industriali, p. 61 (only the external aspect of the object is subject to the
morality requirement).
56 For an application, see Trib. Brescia, 25/3/1954, Santini v. Polloni, Riv. Prop. Int. ed
Indus., 1955, 131 (is void for lack of extrinsic novelty the design which is divulged to third
parties before application. A typical case of divulgation is the sale of object to an
undetermined number of people).
57 See Fabiani, Modelli e Design Industriali, p. 55 and E. Bonasi Benucci, ‘Forma del
prodotto e sua tutela’ (1958) Riv. Dir. Industriale 426, at 428. For an application, see
Trib. Milan, 6/10/1955,Ditta Mario Giamperi v. Fratelli Mariani S.p.a., Riv. Prop. Int. ed
Indus., 1955, 257 (simple objective novelty, i.e. a differentiation from what existed
before, is not sufﬁcient to have a valid ornamental design or model. One needs the
expression of a new ornamental idea, the existence of elements capable to give, to those
who cultivate aesthetics in the ﬁeld of the objects in question, the sensation of a new
aesthetic). There were two trends in the courts’ interpretation of this criterion, one quite
strict and the other more liberal: for decisions, see Guglielmetti, Le invenzioni e modelli
industriali dopo la riforma del 1979, p. 190 and note 19.
58 Fabiani,Modelli e Design Industriali, pp. 53–6; Suthersanen,Design Law in Europe, p. 220.
Contra: P. Barbieri, ‘Tutela dell’arte applicata all’industria (Brevetti per modello –
Concorrenza sleale)’ (1955) 2 D. Aut. 194 at 203.
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considered abstractly.59 So there was extrinsic novelty when there was a
ﬁgurative expression which, even if the elements or a combination of
these were already known or already applied to other products, met an
aesthetic result ulterior and different in the ﬁeld of the activity
considered.60 There was also no need to show high level of artistry or
artistic merit.61
According to article 7 of the Design Act, the exclusive right belonged to
the author of the new design or its assignees. Unless otherwise provided in
a contract, those designs which were made by employees in the course of
their employment belonged to the employer (art. 7(2)). The designer had
the right to be recognised as the author of the design and have his or her
name written in the register of patents. Commissioned designs belonged
to the commissionee but the delivery transferred the ownership of the
commissioner.62 Co-authors, i.e. persons who contribute to the creativ-
ity, could be co-owners.63 The rights of the design right holder could be
transferred between living persons for free or for a price, or inherited. The
transfer of the design right could be limited in time or object and licences
were possible.64 Transfers had to be done in writing, notarised and
registered at the intellectual property ofﬁce.65 The right holder had the
exclusive right to use the design as in the Patent Act.66 There was
infringement if the whole or substantial part of design was used in a com-
mercial context. The test was that of overall impression.67 Reproduction or
importation of the design for personal use was free.68The term of protection
was four years from ﬁling (art. 9). If a design was not worked within a year of
grant, the right was null (art. 13).69
59 Fabiani,Modelli e Design Industriali, pp. 53–6.
60 Fabiani, ‘Problemi di protezione del design industriale’, pp. 272–3. For applications, see
Cass. Civ., 4/8/1965, n. 1869, D. Aut., 1966, p. 113; Trib. Bologna, 16/5/1974, Giur.
Ann. Dir. Ind., n. 613/2; Trib. Milan, 26/9/1974, Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1974, n. 613/2;
Trib. Monza, 26/11/1973, Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1973, n. 408/2 (it is sufﬁcient to have
novelty in the sector, i.e. that the aesthetic aspect which confers its special ornament to
the industrial product was not yet adopted in respect of industrial products entering in
this sector); Trib. Florence, 18/8/1978, Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1979, n. 1148/1–2.
61 Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 221.
62 Fabiani,Modelli e Design Industriali, pp. 65–6. 63 Ibid., pp. 65–6.
64 Ibid., p. 90; Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 222.
65 Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 222. 66 Ibid., p. 219.
67 Cass. 1st civ., 2/4/1987, Lecce v. S.p.a. Aurora, D. Aut., 1987, p. 502 (overall impression
similar so pen design infringed); Trib. Monza, 21/1/1985, Foro Padano, 1985, p. 234,
Frau Poltrone v. Zani, with comment S. Magelli (overall impression similar so furniture
design infringed).
68 Fabiani,Modelli e Design Industriali, p. 87.
69 Contra: ibid., p. 92 ; Pavanello, ‘The protection of industrial design under Italian law’, p.
165; Guglielmetti, Le invenzioni e modelli industriali dopo la riforma del 1979, pp. 193–4.
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In short, nothing much changed compared to the previous Act apart
from the provisions about commissioned designs, the infringement test
was overall impression, the reproduction or importation for personal use
was not an infringement and the term was doubled (four instead of two
years).
The transition was therefore a very smooth one compared to the
previous period. The vast majority of both courts and literature carried
on applying the separability doctrine, clarifying that it was to be under-
stood not in a material, mechanical sense but in a conceptual, ideal
sense.70
70 See e.g. Cass. 1st civ., 12/8/1946, SA Instituto Proﬁlattico e Farmaceutico Candioli & C. v.
Carlo Frassinelli, Giur. It., 1947, I, 76 (typeface); Cass., 20/1/1951, Giur. Cass. Civ.,
1951, I, 3; Cass., 22/10/1956, n. 3806, Franchi v.Arti Graﬁche Cellerino,Riv. Dir. Comm.,
1958, pp. 172ff (decorated boxes containing ﬂower seeds; artistic value not separable);
Cass., 29/7/1957, Ditta Fontanini v. Giardini, D. Aut., 1958, p. 72 (nativity scenes); CA
Milan, 16/2/1962, unpublished (bag); Trib. Milan, 3/10/1973, Foro Italiano, 1974, item
‘Diritto d’autore’, n. 13 (ashtray, basket and umbrella stand), both cited by Pavanello,
‘The protection of industrial design under Italian law’, p. 160; Trib. Milan, 17/6/1974,
Karoﬂor s.c.r.l. v. Rusconi editore S.p.a. and Laniﬁcio Loreto d’Ambrosio S.p.a., Giur. Ann.
Dir. Indus., 1974, p. 835 (weave pattern for bedspreads and covers not separable); Trib.
Milan, 28/4/1975, Industria Aristica Tito Bianchi s.a.s. v. Magazzini Standa S.p.a., Giur.
Ann. Dir. Indus., 1975, p. 719, aff’d by CA Milan, 28/9/1976, Standa S.p.a. v. Industria
Aristica Tito Bianchi s.a.s. and Others, Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., 1976, p. 860 (statuettes
produced in series and reproducing a work of sculpture separable); Trib. Milan, 30/5/
1974, Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1974, p. 562; CA Milan, 19/7/1985, Fiorucci s.p.a. v.
Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a., Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., 1986, p. 2004 (the design is
separable; it can be enjoyed on any support and it is creative so copyright subsists);
Cass. Sec. crim., 27/1/1977, n. 3238,Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1978, p. 993 (Rietveld’s chair
model ‘red and blue’ inseparable – ‘the original design of a dress, a new type of the body of
a car, the design of a fabric, shape of a dish, or like in this case, the structure of a piece of
furniture, can never be dissociated from the industrial product to which they are applied’,
Trib. Milan, 12/6/1980, Mazzucato v. Artemide S.p.a., D. Aut., 1981, p. 395 (‘Nesso’
lamp not separable (see Figure 8.1); the court, however, also adds that the lamp had been
originally designed to be reproduced in series and its destination was for a competition
and seems to deduce its non-copyrightability from these criteria); Cass., 26/6/1980,Giur.
Annotata di Diritto Industriale, 1980, n. 1258, 61 (Breuer’s Wassily chair: see Figure 8.2);
Magistrate’s Court Alba, 9/1/1992, Box. S.r.l. v.Miroglio Tessile S.p.a., D. Aut., 1992, p.
291 (print design (French poems with ﬂowers) separable); Trib. Florence, 28/1/1988,
Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1988, n. 2285/1; Cass. 1st civ., 7/12/1994, n. 10516,Cassina S.p.a v.
S.r.l. Steel Line, D. Aut., 1996, p. 410; Trib. Brescia, 2/12/1995, D. Aut., 1995, 346. V.
De Sanctis, Observations under Cass., 10/6/1938,Ditta Pignalosa v.DittaModiano,Giur.
Comparata di diritto commerciale, marittimo, aeronautico, industriale e d’autore, 1942, p.
208; Bonasi Benucci, ‘Forma del prodotto e sua tutela’, p. 426, at 439; Fabiani,
‘Problemi di protezione del design industriale’, p. 269; Fabiani, Modelli e Design
Industriali, p. 28; Guglielmetti, Le invenzioni e modelli industriali dopo la riforma del 1979,
p. 185; and others including Vercellone, Ascarelli, Bergomi, Algardi, Auteri, Benussi and
Sena all cited by Morri, ‘Le opere dell’industrial design tra diritto d’autore e tutela come
modelli industriali: Deve cambiare tutto perché (quasi) nulla cambi?’, p. 187 note 27,
who notes that the literature is unanimous on this point.
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However, this ideal separability was understood in two different ways by
courts and commentators.71 For some commentators, a creation was pro-
tectable by copyright if it could be reproduced on media different from the
product to which it is originally associated (Auteri72), i.e. when one can
assume the artistic value even if executed on or with materials other than
that of the industrial product (Greco-Vercellone). According to the second
interpretation, an object was separable ideally when it could be enjoyed as
pure aesthetic fact, e.g. as when one contemplates an exhibition, indepen-
dently from its use in the practical function to which it is destined (Sena).
This interpretation meant a higher artistic level of the object instead or in
addition to separability.73 Whilst the courts embraced the ideal separability
concept, it is not always easy to determine which of the two interpretations
they adopt as they use ambivalent language.74 If a court follows the ﬁrst
interpretation, there is never protection by copyright because the object of
industrial design is the fusionof the aestheticwith the functional and thus can
only be the shape of this object and cannot be thought of in relation to a
different object.75On theother hand, quasi76 all two-dimensional designs are
protected under this ﬁrst interpretation. If one follows the second interpreta-
tion, industrial designwill not normally be protected by copyright but will be
only in the rare hypotheses of objects particularly successfully designed.77
71 G. Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’, in Contratto e Impresa (Padova: CEDAM, 1987), pp.
970–1.
72 For Auteri, ‘Industrial design’, in Dizionari di diritto privato a cura d’Irti, vol. 11, in U.
Carnevali, Diritto Commerciale e Industriale (Milan (s.d. ma), 1985), p. 588, ideal separ-
ability means that it is not necessary that the work can be removed materially from the
product but it is sufﬁcient that the creation can be reproduced on differentmedia than the
product to which it is originally associated.
73 See Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’, at 967 citing V. Mangini and G. Auletta, Azienda,
Opera dell’Ingegno e Invenzioni Industriali, Commentari del cod. Civ. A cura di Scialoja e
Branca (Bologna/Rome: Zanichelli, 1947), pp. 325–6. Di Cataldo, Serra, Sena and
Franzosi, for whom the criterion of separability meant artistic value, and Bonasi
Benucci, Greco-Vercellone and Guglielmetti, for whom both separability and a value
judgment were needed. See also Piola Caselli (above, note 34). For reference to the
authors cited above, see Bergomi, pp. 979–81. See Auteri, ‘Industrial design’, i.e. Greco-
Vercellone p. 78, Sena p. 453, Benucci, p. 153. Trib. Roma, 4/9/1963, Autojournal v.
Autorama,D.Aut. 1964, p. 49 (car body panel not to be protected by copyright – art. 2(4)
and (5) of the Copyright Act 1941 require artistic quality as necessary condition to have
protection); Trib. Siena, 30/10/1985, D. Aut., 1988, p. 209 (Le Corbusier’s chaise
longue copyrightable because of high artistic value but not other furniture designed by
the same author), rev’d byCAFlorence, 4/2/1989,Zanova S.r.l. v.Cassina,D.Aut., 1989,
p. 444. See also CA Florence, 9/1/1978, Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind., 1979, p. 210.
74 Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’, p. 971.
75 Ibid., who prefers the ﬁrst interpretation because the secondmakes a value judgment and
this is dangerous.
76 Ibid., p. 973 citing Greco-Vercellone and Trib. Milan, 17/6/1974, Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind.,
1974, p. 835.
77 Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’, p. 972.
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That said, the end result of the application of the doctrine was that a lot
of worthy three-dimensional works of applied art, most famously furni-
ture designed by Le Corbusier and other well-known designers,78 ended
Figure 8.1 The so-called lamp ‘Nesso’ produced by Artemide and
designed by Giancarlo Mattioli
78 See Cass., 10/10/1975, Giur. Dir. Int., 1978, p. 3, categorically excluding that the
structure of a piece of furniture could be protected by copyright; Trib. Monza, 21/1/
1985, Foro Padano, 1985, I, c. 234, with comment by S. Magelli, ‘La tutela brevettuale
del design’ (armchair ‘Cobra’ was only susceptible of registered design protection);
Trib. Florence, 20/10/1988, S.p.a. Cassina v. S.r.l. Alivar and Matrix S.r.l., D. Aut.,
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up unprotected by copyright law.79 This meant the courts favoured the
ﬁrst interpretation of the doctrine, i.e. artistic merit or value was not
Figure 8.2 Marcel Breuer’s Wassily chair
1989, p. 455 (none of the six chair designs were separable); Magistrate’s Court
Florence, 26/1/1989, S.p.a. Cassina v. S.r.l. Alivar, D. Aut., 1989, p. 82 (Le
Corbusier furniture unprotected by copyright as not separable) aff’d by CA Florence,
4/2/1989, Zanova S.r.l. v. Cassina, D. Aut., 1989, p. 444 and by Cass. 1st civ., 7/12/
1994, n. 10516, Cassina S.p.a v. S.r.l. Steel Line, D. Aut., 1996, p. 410.
79 See e.g. Auteri, ‘Industrial design’, p. 582.
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required.80 On the other hand, paradoxically, two-dimensional works of
little value were protected,81 something the Act had in fact tried to avoid.
It was, on the other hand, clear in the case law that the number of copies
was an irrelevant criterion,82 as well as the criterion of aim or destination,83
even if it was favoured by some commentators.84 In conclusion, for both
the case law and literature, Italy was in a state of partial cumulation.
Then, in the 1990s, the courts embraced an even stricter interpretation
of the separability doctrine, based on an article written by another judge of
the Court of Cassation, and also expert in copyright law, Paolo Vercellone.
Already in 1956, Vercellone advocated ‘excluding from copyright protec-
tion those three-dimensional works of applied art which, if reproduced on a
different substance or embodied in another object, would lose their aes-
thetic value, since they could be conceived as merely an aesthetic quality of
a certain industrial product’.85 This did not mean that sculptural works
were excluded but only useful articles. ‘Only sculptures applied to articles
could have received copyright protection, not works reﬂecting designs and
modelling activities (for example, the sculpture of the “ﬂying lady” applied
to the hood of Rolls Royce automobiles would be copyrightable but not the
design – however aesthetically motivated or pleasing – of the car itself).’86
This trend started with a 1990 decision of the Court of Cassation,
which held that copyright does not apply to those three-dimensional
forms which cannot be other than the form of a certain product, e.g.
a fork, a television set, a bag, a shoe.87 The Court added that some
80 V. De Sanctis, Observations under Cass., 10/6/1938, Ditta Pignalosa v. Ditta Modiano,
Giur. Comparata di diritto commerciale, marittimo, aeronautico, industriale e d’autore, 1942,
p. 208; Di Franco, ‘Nozione teorica e disciplina legale dell’arte applicata all’industria’,
p. 269. Trib. Florence 20/10/1988, S.p.a. Cassina v. S.r.l. Alivar and Matrix S.r.l., D.
Aut., 1989, p. 455 (Le Corbusier chairs); Cass. 1st civ., 5/7/1990, n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a.
v.Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a.,D. Aut., 1991, at 67. Guglielmetti, Le invenzioni e modelli
industriali dopo la riforma del 1979, p. 185; Auteri, ‘Industrial design’, pp. 582, 587 also
criticising this criterion as arbitrary.
81 Morri, ‘Le opere dell’industrial design tra diritto d’autore e tutela come modelli indus-
triali: Deve cambiare tutto perché (quasi) nulla cambi?’, pp. 190–1 and references cited;
Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-designed product’, p. 157.
82 Fabiani, ‘Problemi di protezione del design industriale’, p. 269. Cass. 1st civ., 5/7/1990,
n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a. v.Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a., D. Aut., 1991, p. 63.
83 Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’, p. 969 and decisions cited: e.g. CAMilan, 19/7/1985,Giur.
Ann. Dir. Indus., 1986, p. 2004, Fiorucci S.p.a. v. Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a. Contra:
Trib. Milan, 4/10/1973, Bruno Danese and Bruno Danese s.n.c. v. G.B. Carpano – Antica
fabbrica di vermouth S.p.a. and E. Mari, Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., 1973, p. 396.
84 Bonasi Benucci, ‘Forma del prodotto e sua tutela’, at 430, 446–8.
85 Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-designed product’, pp. 154–5.
86 Ibid.
87 Cass. 1st civ., 5/7/1990, n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a. v.Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a.,D. Aut.,
1991 (cloth design made of coloured squares), and restated in Cass. 1st civ., 7/12/1994,
n. 10516,Cassina S.p.a v. S.r.l. Steel Line,D.Aut., 1996, p. 410. The court in 1994 seems
to go further and rejects the protection of any three-dimensional object. That would go
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two-dimensional designs are also excluded because they are not separ-
able, e.g. typographical characters, symbols on a watch or clock and
railings, while other two-dimensional designs are separable, such as com-
binations of lines and colours for scarves, ties and cloth for dresses.88 It
also held that it was clear that the legislator of 1941 rejected all the other
criteria except that of separability89 and that one cannot try to circumvent
the separability criterion by trying to classify the work in another category
(e.g. work of architecture or an atypical category of work of industrial art)
in order to have copyright protection.90
Many commentators were still unsatisﬁed with the newDesign Act, for
the duration of the right was still too short, the procedure too complex
and the fees too high.91 While many commentators were happy with the
separability criterion,92 and thought cumulation ought to be limited as
too far as it would exclude all sculptures, which have no other function than decorative
and are listed as copyright works in the Act. So it probably meant to include only
functional objects.
88 Cass. 1st civ., 5/7/1990, n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a. v.Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a.,D. Aut.,
1991, p. 63 at 67. However, forMorri, ‘Le opere dell’industrial design tra diritto d’autore
e tutela come modelli industriali: Deve cambiare tutto perché (quasi) nulla cambi?’, p.
191, apart from one isolated case, in the few cases decided on two-dimensional works,
judges always considered those designs separable, quoting CAMilan, 19/7/1985, inGiur.
Ann. Dir. Ind., 1985, n. 2005 (Naj Oleari); Cass. 5/7/1990, n. 7077,Giur. Ann. Dir. Ind.,
1990, 2474; D. Aut., 1991, 63; Riv. Dir. Ind., 1991, II, 24, with comment Sena,
‘Industrial design e diritto d’autore’; in Giur. it., 1991, I, c. 58, with comment M.
Ricolﬁ, ‘Il criterio della scindibilità e l’opera “bidimensionale” dell’arte applicata all’in-
dustria’; Trib. Como, 12/2/1996 (ord.), 1996, n. 3465 (design of a cloth composed of
known elements, i.e. small houses, teddies, ﬂowers and little hearts).
89 Cass., 5/7/1990, n. 2035, Fiorucci S.p.a. v.Manifattura Naj Oleari S.p.a., D. Aut., 1991,
p. 63 at 66. See also Cass. 1st civ., 7/12/1994, n. 10516, Cassina S.p.a. v. S.r.l. Steel Line,
D. Aut., 1996, p. 410 at 414. However, in its 1994 decision, the court requires not only
creativity but also novelty for copyright to subsist.
90 Cass. 1st civ., 7/12/1994, n. 10516, Cassina S.p.a. v. S.r.l. Steel Line, D. Aut., 1996, p.
410 at 416.
91 E. Valerio, ‘Modelli e disegni ornamentali e diritto di autore’ (1948)D. Aut. 317 at 322–
3. Similarly, see also V. De Sanctis, ‘Convegno per la tutela delle arti applicate all’indus-
tria, Milan 15–16 May 1940, La tutela giuridica dell’arte industriale, Relazioni generale
preliminare della S.I.A.E.’ (1940) D. Aut. 208 at 215; Piola Caselli, ‘L’allacciamento
della protezione dell’arte industriale con la protezione del diritto d’autore’, p. 15, at 23–4;
Bonasi Benucci, ‘Forma del prodotto e sua tutela’, p. 426; Fabiani, Modelli e Design
Industriali, p. 93 (whowould prefer a relatively short period but with possibility to renew);
Pavanello, ‘The protection of industrial design under Italian law’, p. 175; ALAI, Travaux
de la réunion d’Amsterdam, 10th report, Report of M. Luzzati, ‘L’œuvre d’art appliquée
à l’industrie’, 1956, p. 138, at 139–40 (term too short).
92 Auletta, Ramella, Biamonti, Ghiron, De Sanctis and anonymous commentators after
decisions of Cass., 19/12/1931, D. Aut., 1932, p. 128; CA Milan, 17/7/1933, Riv. Prop.
Intell. e Ind., 1933, p. 305; Cass., 20/12/1937, Riv. Prop. Intell. e Ind., 1937, p. 151; CA
Brescia, 12/12/1933, Riv. Prop. Intell. e Ind., 1933, p. 88; Cass., 25/1/1933, Riv. Prop.
Intell. e Ind., 1933, p. 88, all cited by Spallino, ‘Rassegna di dottrina in tema disegni e
modelli industriali 1883–1953’, p. 276, at 281. See also Fabiani, Modelli e Design
Industriali, p. 29.
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much as possible,93 some proposed to use other, previous, theories to
complement the separability criterion when it does not give satisfactory
results, e.g. the function of the product, destination of the form, reprodu-
cibility by mechanical means, aesthetic prevalence, autonomous charac-
ter of the work of art as opposed to the accessorial character that the
design or model may have as regards the industrial product, and the
absence, in the work of art, of utilitarian aims which would be character-
istic of designs and models.94
Some other commentators were against the separability doctrine
because it is difﬁcult and arbitrary to apply95 or plainly ‘wrong’, ‘illusory’
or ‘without sense’.96
In conclusion, at the end of this long period, even if the criterion of
separability did not ﬁnd unanimous agreement, it worked rather well even
if it excluded most three-dimensional works of applied art. Because of
this, if restrictive, effect, the law was very predictable.
93 Di Franco, ‘Nozione teorica e disciplina legale dell’arte applicata all’industria’, p. 269, at
276; Barbieri, ‘Tutela dell’arte applicata all’industria (Brevetti per modello –
Concorrenza sleale)’, p. 194 at 202.
94 Fabiani, ‘Problemi di protezione del design industriale’, p. 271; P. Greco, I Diritti sui Beni
Immateriali (Turin: Giappichelli, 1948), p. 171; Auteri, ‘Industrial design’, p. 583 citing
T. Ascarelli,Teoria della Concorrenza e dei Beni Immateriali (Milan: Giuffrè, 1960), p. 677;
E. Bonasi Benucci, Tutela della forma nel diritto industriale (Milan: Giuffrè, 1963), pp.
219ff; Fabiani, Modelli e Design Industriali, pp. 18ff. See also Z. Algardi, Disegno
Industriale e Arte Applicata (Milan: Giuffrè, 1977), cited by Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’,
p. 969. Contra: Vercellone, comment under Cass., 22/10/1956, n. 3806, Franchi v. Arti
Graﬁche Cellerino, Riv. Dir. Comm., 1958, pp. 172ff at 174–5.
95 Barbieri, ‘Tutela dell’arte applicata all’industria (Brevetti per modello – Concorrenza
sleale)’, p. 194 at 198; Bonasi Benucci, ‘Forma del prodotto e sua tutela’, p. 426 at 441 (if
separability is interpreted as artistic value, it leaves the judge arbiter of the merit of the
work, who, not knowing how to do so, defers to an expert), also citing E. Valerio and Z.
Algardi, Il Diritto d’Autore (Milan: Giuffrè, 1943), p. 38; Fabiani, ‘Problemi di protezione
del design industriale’, pp. 270ff; S. Giudici, ‘Dell’opera d’arte applicata all’industrial
design’ (1989) Riv. Dir. Indus. 268 at 277–8 (the utilitarian character of the work should
not be an obstacle to copyright protection as architectural works and software can be
protected, why not industrial design?); Bergomi, ‘Industrial design’, p. 968, also citing
Algardi and De Sanctis.
96 Morri, ‘Le opere dell’industrial design tra diritto d’autore e tutela come modelli indus-
triali: Deve cambiare tutto perché (quasi) nulla cambi?’, p. 187 and note 26, citing
Auletta-Mangini, Delle invenzioni industriali. Dei modelli di utilità e dei disegni ornamentali.
Della concorrenza, in Commentario al C.C. a cura di Scialoja and Branca, Libro V, arts.
2584–601 (Bologna/Roma, 1973), 120; V. Di Cataldo, L’Imitazione Servile (Milan:
Giuffrè, 1979), p. 128; F. Benussi, ‘Protezione del disegno industriale – Necessità
produttiva e ﬁnalità di una normativa’, in Disegno Industriale e Protezione Europea. Atti
del Convegno Internazionale di Treviso 12–13 ottobre 1988 (Milan, 1989), 21, 30; W.
Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière des dessins et modèles industriels’ (1978) 97 Revue Internationale du
Droit d’Auteur 63 at 65.
288 Estelle Derclaye
S
MP
LE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19867-8 — The Copyright/Design Interface
Edited by Estelle Derclaye 
More Information
www.cambridge.org© Cambridge University Press
8.2.4 Fourth Period: 1996–1997: Back to Full Cumulation but with
a Shorter Copyright Term?
In 1996–7, there was a short period of about eight months during
which Italy abolished the separability criterion. On 23/12/1996, Act
n. 650 was adopted and its article 1(58) provided that ‘copyright on
works of industrial design is comprised in the protection of the Act
of 22/4/1941, n. 633’. ‘The exact limits, the procedure and the
requirements for and manner of this protection were left to regula-
tions that should have been issued by the Italian government.’97
Supposedly, article 1(58) eliminated the separability criterion, thus
reverting back to the ﬁrst period of full cumulation.98 However, the
norm was unclear and the literature disagreed on the meaning of the
article. Act n. 650/1996 was abrogated just a few months later by
Act n. 266 of 7/8/1997 and, between 1997 and 2001, the country
reverted back to the situation in the third period described above in
section 8.2.3.
Act n. 266/1997 also enacted in its article 27(2) a rule which said
that ‘the duration of copyright protection for works of industrial
design, under the 25/8/1940 Act n. 1411, cannot be superior to 15
years until the design directive is transposed’. Oddly, the provision
did not specify the moment when the ﬁfteen years had to be calcu-
lated. The provision was contrary to the EU Term Directive99 and it
was also not clear whether article 27(2) of Act n. 266 abolished
article 5(2) of the Design Act 1940 according to which the provisions
of the Copyright Act were not applicable to industrial designs and
models.100 Possibly, the provision meant to shorten the copyright
term of protection of works of applied art to a maximum of ﬁfteen
years to coincide with the term of protection of designs under the
new Design Directive but the commentators had different interpreta-
tions of the norm.101
97 Pavanello, ‘The protection of industrial design under Italian law’, p. 154.
98 Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe, p. 209; Pavanello, ‘The protection of industrial
design under Italian law’, p. 153; Morri, ‘Le opere dell’industrial design tra diritto
d’autore e tutela come modelli industriali: Deve cambiare tutto perché (quasi) nulla
cambi?’, pp. 193–4. Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-designed product’,
p. 199, however, thinks that ‘the plausible meaning of this provision was that of
eliminating any distinction between the level of creativity requested for the protection
of industrial design and that ordinarily required for other works of authorship’.
99 L. Chimienti, ‘Opere del disegno industriale e diritto d’autore, Una discutibile innova-
zione legislativa’ (1997) D. Aut. 462.
100 Ibid.
101 For a list of commentators and summary of their views, see Morri, ‘Le opere dell’in-
dustrial design tra diritto d’autore e tutela comemodelli industriali: Deve cambiare tutto
perché (quasi) nulla cambi?’, p. 195.
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8.2.5 Fifth Period: 1997–2001: Back to Partial Cumulation
and Demarcation for 3D Functional Objects
During the ﬁfth period, the 1941 Copyright Act and the 1940 Design Act
still applied as well as the 1939 Patent Act. Apart from article 27 of Act n.
266/97 limiting the duration of works of applied art to ﬁfteen years, the
ﬁfth period resembled the third in all points. Therefore, separability and
demarcation for three-dimensional objects applied.
8.2.6 Sixth Period: 2001 to Present: ‘Artistic Value’ Test
An Act of 2 February 2001 implemented the Design Directive in Italy.102
For the rest, the copyright remained in the main unchanged in relation
to the provisions relevant to works of applied art,103 and with the Design
Directive having left almost no options to Member States, the legal
picture is the same as in other Member States.
Article 22 of the Act implementing the Design Directive amended
article 2(4) of the 1941 Copyright Act by removing the requirement for
separability and adding to the categories of protected works, as a new
point 10: ‘industrial designs which possess in themselves creative char-
acter and artistic value’.104 Separability is therefore a thing of the past.
However, the double criteria of creative character and artistic value have
been interpreted in various ways by courts.105 Some courts have clearly
stated these two requirements were different, others merged them into a
single criterion and in any case gave either or both very different mean-
ings. Most recently, many courts have interpreted the criterion of artistic
value as ‘the judgment of history’; in other words, art experts and
102 Legislative Decree n. 95 of 2 February 2001 implementing Directive 98/71 (GURI
N. 79 of 4 April 2001), which entered into force on 19 April 2001.
103 One exception is that, unless agreed otherwise, the economic rights on works of indus-
trial design created by employees during the course of their employment belong to the
employer (art. 12 ter. of the 1941Copyright Act as amended). Following the adoption of
the InfoSoc directive, Act n. 68 of 9 April 2003 also implemented in Italian law more
exceptions and re-worded the rights of reproduction, communication to the public and
distribution.
104 Article 2.10’s ambiguous wording (‘in themselves’ and ‘artistic value’) does not mean
that the criterion of separability has been reintroduced. See A. Musso, Diritto di autore
sulle opera dell’ingegno letterarie e artistiche (Bologna: Zanichelli), p. 80; P. Marchetti and
L. Ubertazzi, Commentario breve alle leggi su proprieta intellettuale e concorrenza, 4th edn
(Padova: CEDAM, 2007), p. 345.
105 E. Derclaye, ‘Are fashion designers better protected in continental Europe than in the
United Kingdom? A comparative analysis of the recent case law in France, Italy and the
United Kingdom’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of World Intellectual Property 315 at 323–7 and
decisions cited. The article reviews the case law from 2004 to 2009. For details of the
litigation post DesignDirective, see alsoMarzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-
designed product’, pp. 219–21.
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museums decide which works of applied art are protectable.106 Much
litigation on designs has been fought in this last period with varied results,
best illustrated by the continuation, post implementation of the Design
Directive, of the Le Corbusier chair saga started in the 1980s and con-
cluded in the mid-1990s.107 The resulting situation on the copyright/
design interface in Italy during that period was therefore one of high legal
uncertainty, owing to the different criteria the courts use to determine if a
work of applied art can enjoy copyright protection.
However, in 2015, the Supreme Court endorsed the ‘judgment of
history’ criterion and clariﬁed that the two criteria of creative character
and artistic value are separate. The ﬁrst means a ‘personal and individual
expression’. As to the second, the court ﬁrst uttered that the criterion
cannot be deﬁned exhaustively but a series of objective and subjective
parameters can be listed.108 The subjective parameters, such as the taste,
artistic sensibility, aesthetic sense, etc. of the person who considers the
work, must be corroborated with objective parameters, the most relevant
of which is the recognition, by the relevant cultural institutions, of the
value of the design andwhich transcends functionality andmere elegance.
This parameter can be evidenced by the exhibition of the design in
museums, prizes, publication in non-commercial specialist reviews, etc.
This decision ends the period of uncertainty. That said, the ‘judgment of
history’ criterion is problematic as it decides what is protectable ex post
and is discriminatory against young, upcoming designers. The court
recognised the problem and said that the criterion is not an absolute
one and each case has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
8.3 Analysis
In this ﬁnal section, we draw conclusions as to the efﬁciency of the law in
the different periods and the reasons for changing it. We also evaluate
whether one type of system (full cumulation, partial cumulation or
demarcation) is better on the basis of the Italian experience, also drawing
from Italian economic and design history.
The Italian history of the copyright/design interface prior to the Design
Directive in practice boils down to two periods: one of full cumulation
106 Marzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a well-designed product’, pp. 213 and 227 and
references cited.
107 See above, notes 78 and 80. For details of the Le Corbusier litigation after the imple-
mentation of theDesignDirective in Italy, seeMarzano, ‘An ill-designed protection for a
well-designed product’, pp. 221–5.
108 Italian Supreme Court, Judgment No. 23292, of 13 November 2015, Metalco S.p.a.,
Metalco S.r.l. v. City Design S.r.l. and Others (street shelter lacks artistic value).
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and one of partial cumulation with demarcation for 3D functional
objects. Over a century and a half, a system of all or nothing shifted
between two extremes. The ﬁrst period spanning sixty years from 1865
to 1925 was deﬁnitely a disaster in terms of design protection – since the
Act’s term of protection was so short, there was an extremely low number
of designs registered. What can be said, though, is that in the only
reported decision on a registered design, the court held it was unpro-
tected. Copyright therefore ﬁlled the gap, but since there was so little
litigation, it is hard to say whether full cumulation was a satisfactory
system. However, in theory, provided a design was original and new,
there could be an overlap and there could have been some regime clashes.
While the Patent Act provided for the right to belong to the employer if
the employee created the design during the course of his duties, the
Copyright Act was silent, so a clash could have occurred if the courts
had interpreted the Copyright Act the opposite way. The same could have
happened if the courts had interpreted the infringement conditions dif-
ferently or created different exceptions.
Italian economic and design history for this period and up to the
Second World War is a probable additional cause for the small amount
of litigation. Italy had a very late industrial revolution. Society was mainly
rural and there was very low industrialisation until the 1890s and very
little mass production until after the SecondWorldWar, so Italian design
boomed only thereafter.109 It must have meant that it was hard to man-
ufacture copies of 3D products at least. In addition, as there was very little
export, Italian design must have been barely known abroad, and thus it
must have been rare for cheap knock-off copies made abroad to ﬂood the
Italian market. Most probably, the combination of a short design protec-
tion making knock-off copies less interesting to make as the cost of the
original must have gone down anyway after the two or four years of
protection had lapsed, and the economic structure in the design indus-
tries (a vast majority of small family-owned workshops), must have made
it useless to litigate: most designers had no money nor time to sue, while
the time that litigation takes would have been working against them.
From 1925 to 2001 (not counting the few months in the mid-1990s
where full cumulation arguably resumed during which in any case there
was hardly any relevant case law), there were more decisions but the vast
majority of the 3D objects were declared unprotected by copyright while
the vast majority of 2D designs were declared protectable. On the other
hand, design protection was still very short – four years until 1977 – and
109 P. Sparke,Design in Italy, 1870 to the Present (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988), pp. 15–
20 at 41.
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hardly litigated upon, probably for that very reason. For the period from
around 1940 to 1977, one of the factors from the previous period, i.e. in
the vast majority, a structure made of very small companies,110 can also
explain the relatively low registered design application and litigation level.
In addition, the fact that much design was highly or solely functional111
may also explain why there was no protection by either copyright or
design and thus virtually no litigation on registered design right.
Instead, the aura and quality of the design that justiﬁed high prices
which helped recoup costs, and/or the patronage that designers beneﬁted
from,112 probably meant there was no need for design protection or no
need to sue if there was. Also, the mid-1970s were years of profound
insecurity in Italy – economically, socially and culturally.113 Indeed,
design applications went down a lot in 1973–5 (there is no data for
1976–7), then go up hugely in 1978–9 (9,464 in 1978 and 8,172 in
1979 from 2,984 in 1975, ca. triple) because by the mid-1970s the
economic slump was over but most probably also because of the increase
in the duration of registered design protection from four to ﬁfteen years
with the 1977 Act. Thereafter and until the 1990s, the economic struc-
ture remained rather similar (majority of small ﬁrms in the ﬁeld of design)
and high quality design still sold well abroad. From then on, it seems that
ﬂuctuations in applications vary with economic slumps.114 Applications
go down a lot in 1981–3, are back up between 1984 and 1986, then down
again in 1987–9 and the early 1990s. They shoot off in 1998 until 2002,
most likely because of the adoption of the Design Directive (this effect is
also seen for many other Member States). Then applications go down
dramatically from 2003. (A probable cause is the entry into force of the
Community Design System; this effect is also seen in other Member
States.) Applications then more or less stabilise between 2008 and
2014.115 Since 2001, copyright litigation involving designs has carried
110 P. Sparke,Design in Italy, 1870 to the Present, p. 92 and p. 165 respectively. (In 1947, 90
per cent of Italian ﬁrms employed only ﬁve people and fewer, and in 1971, 81.8 per cent
of manufacturing ﬁrms had fewer than ﬁve workers.)
111 Ibid., pp. 112–13, 176. For instance, the brothers Castiglioni made lamps whose
appearance was dictated solely by their technological and utilitarian constraints, e.g.
the Tubino lamp which stood up by twisting its tubular structure (1951). Another
example by the brothers is the Luminator consisting of a stand with three feet, a column
and a light bulb (1955). Another example is Colombini’s plastic dustbin manufactured
by Kartell in 1955. See ibid., pp. 121 and 128–9.
112 Ibid., p. 116. 113 Ibid., p. 195.
114 Ibid., p. 205. In Italy in 1980–3, there was a slump in domestic demand and exports,
with a small recovery in 1983.
115 For the detailed statistics, see graph in the Annex in the last chapter. Interestingly, the
ﬁnancial crisis does not seem to have had a big effect; a probable reason may be the
banks’ bail out.
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on steadily. Litigation on the registered design also picked up after the
implementation of the Design Directive.116 It could well be because the
separability doctrine disappeared leading, among others, to a renewed
interest in copyright protection by ﬁrms holding rights on iconic designs,
as the Le Corbusier recent saga suggests. Of course, empirical analysis
must be carried out to verify these suggestions but we have already high-
lighted a number of important factors which will enable us to start such
analysis.
As to why the Italian legislature modiﬁed the law on the copyright/
design interface in 1941, it was a very particular situation as it was only
down to a single man and his special inﬂuence as member of the Supreme
Court and senator rapporteur of the 1941 Copyright Bill.117 Of course,
Piola Caselli also managed to convince other judges, commentators and
members of Parliament and that must have helped. The separability test
also had a very long life and the question to be asked at this juncture is
whether the separability criterion worked well. It seemed like it did as, in
the end, its application by the vast majority of courts was quite consistent
and simply boiled down to the exclusion of functional three-dimensional
objects and a few functional two-dimensional ones (such as those men-
tioned as examples by the Court of Cassation in its 1990 decision, e.g.
typographical characters, symbols on a watch). Because of its relatively
straightforward interpretation, it was rather simple to use, much less
arbitrary than some commentators had criticised and certainly better
than the current criterion of artistic value, which deﬁnitely is arbitrary
as it leaves the art experts as judges of the copyrightability of works of
applied art. This demarcation for 3D objects helped avoid overlap pro-
blems down the line since only one type of protection could apply, that of
the Design Act or that of the Copyright Act. In effect, it was impossible to
ﬁnd any decision where an overlap problem arose. This did not mean that
overlap problems did not exist in practice but the lack of decisions at least
shows that the iceberg was probably very small. The lack of lobbying to
change the criterion over such a long period of time shows that the design
industry was not so unhappy with the test as to push for reform.118On the
other hand, the design industry was unhappy with the 1868 and 1940
Design Acts, especially the term of protection, but, despite numerous
attempts, did not have enough clout to effect a legal change until the 1977
116 See Derclaye (above, note 105) (at least around twenty reported cases between 2001
and 2009 in the – broadly deﬁned – area of fashion design).
117 Thanks to Prof. Ricolﬁ for conﬁrming this and adding that Piola Caselli had a lot of
personal prestige.
118 M. Ricolﬁ also shares this view.
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Act, which lengthened the duration of the design right, and then until the
Design Directive, which gave Italy a ‘proper’, in the sense of efﬁcient and
full-blown, design law. This may mean that design creation (at least for
3D products) was not really affected by the Design Act’s poor protection
and even possibly in some cases was incentivised by it.119 A number of
factors helped Italian design to thrive including quality, patronage and
incessant innovation.120 Indeed, this constant innovation may well have
been caused by the short period of protection especially for designs
affected by fashion effects and thus quickly became outdated.
In summary, the separability criterion was a success in terms of its
ease of application and relatively strong legal certainty. It seems,
therefore, simply on the basis of the Italian experience (for a com-
plete analysis examining all systems, see Chapter 12), that a system
based on conceptual separability (understood in the ﬁrst interpreta-
tion explained in section 8.2.3) would work well. However, it would
need to be coupled with a reasonably long registered design protec-
tion so that 3D designs, and the remainder of uncopyrightable 2D
designs, are adequately protected. This is the case now with the
Design Directive. As to whether a system of full cumulation would
work, it is not possible to say on the basis of the Italian experience as
it did not really exist because of the extremely short (two years)
period of protection for designs during 1868 and 1925 which led to
very low numbers of registered designs and consequently scarce case
law. Both the copyright and design laws were also rather sketchy or
non-existent on certain points, so it was unclear whether regime
clashes could have occurred. Under a full cumulation system, how-
ever, legal certainty is also high as it is clear that each design or work
of applied art is protected both by the Design and the Copyright Acts
if it meets all conditions, provided such conditions are clear. But a
full cumulation system can only work if the rules are well aligned so
as to avoid regime clashes and overprotection.121 As the law stands in
most EU countries, there is at present a high potentiality of regime
clashes, mainly owing to the different tests of infringement and
exceptions in copyright and design law. In conclusion, both systems
119 See e.g. P. Belleﬂamme, www.ipdigit.eu/2010/09/what-is-the-link-between-competi
tion-and-innovation, pointing out that establishing the link between competition and
innovation is complex and depends on many economic relationships that vary across
market environments. Many empirical research ﬁndings thus have found contradicting
results on this issue.
120 On such innovation, see Sparke, Design in Italy, 1870 to the Present, pp. 165, 195, 205.
121 E. Derclaye and M. Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps: A European Perspective
(Oxford: Hart, 2011), ch. 7, sections 4 and 5.
The Copyright/Design Interface in Italy 295
SA
MP
LE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19867-8 — The Copyright/Design Interface
Edited by Estelle Derclaye 
More Information
www.cambridge.org© Cambridge University Press
could therefore work but giving very different results – with full
cumulation, double protection creates very strong and long protec-
tion for all designs, while under a system of partial cumulation with
demarcation for 3D designs, the protection is weaker as it is generally
unique (i.e. via design law only) and shorter. The vast majority of 2D
designs, on the other hand, are almost always separable, and there-
fore beneﬁt from both copyright and design protection if they fulﬁl
both laws’ protection requirements. Thus full cumulation and the
separability doctrine lead to identical results for most 2D designs.
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12 A Model Copyright/Design Interface: Not
an Impossible and Undesirable Task?
Estelle Derclaye*
12.1 Introduction and Preliminary Thoughts
This ﬁnal chapter draws fromall the chapters in an attempt to determine the
most adequate rules to regulate the interface between copyright and design
protection. Themain standard to determine such rules is a balanced protec-
tion, namely avoiding both under- and over-protection. To achieve such
balanced protection, criteria to regulate the interface used in the countries
reviewed are evaluated, and simplicity and efﬁciency of the system for both
designers and users are also important criteria which guide the chapter. The
chapter starts with a historical account of the efforts made both at interna-
tional and EU level to regulate the interface (12.2). It then compares the
experiences of the countries reviewed in this volume over the years to
discover similarities, differences and trends (12.3). The chapter carries on
by assessing the adequacy of the possiblemodels and criteria to organise the
interface (12.4). It then compares the experiences of the countries reviewed
in this volume over the years to discover similarities, differences and trends
(12.3 andAnnex at 12.7). The chapter carries on by assessing the adequacy
of the possible models and criteria to organise the interface (12.4) and
ﬁnishes by proposing a model copyright/design interface (12.5–12.6).
The ﬁrst thing to discuss before embarking on this chapter is if it makes
sense or is desirable to ﬁnd a model for the copyright/design interface. Two
arguments can be made against ﬁnding such a model. The ﬁrst argument is
whether harmonisation is always by deﬁnition a good thing.1 This ﬁrst
* I would like to thank Yves Gaubiac, Jean-Michel Bruguière and Pascale Tréﬁgny for
sending me materials and Lionel Bently and Marco Ricolﬁ for generously and tirelessly
answering countless questions about the Italian and UK systems. I am also grateful to
Isabella Alexander, Lionel Bently, Jason DuMont, Jane Ginsburg, Masahiro Motoyama,
Maria-Daphne Papadopoulou, Antoon Quaedvlieg and Irini Stamatoudi for their com-
ments on a previous version of this chapter, and LynneChave for the data compilation and
graphs as well as insights from her practitioner’s perspective. All potential errors remain
my own. Unless otherwise stated, all footnotes in quotes are omitted.
1 A.Kingsbury, ‘International harmonisationofdesigns law:Thecase fordiversity’ (2010)EIPR
382, at 392 and references cited at note 63; see themany contributions and especially A.Ohly,
‘Concluding remarks, postmodernism and beyond’, in A. Ohly and J. Pila (eds.), The
Europeanisation of Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 260.
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argument is further divided in two. First, harmonisation is contestable
because there is not always one good way of doing something but several
equallygoodways; and, secondly, it prevents thepossibilityof testingdifferent
laws – several countries toying with different laws can act as laboratories,
showing which laws work and which do not. In response to this second
argument, one can say that this has already been done for the copyright/
design interface for over a century. Somany differentmodels have been used
or, if not, discussed extensively that the interface has reached a level of
maturity so that we know with a high degree of certainty which experiments
work and which do not. As to the ﬁrst argument, if several equally good
models can work, there is no reason not to leave a choice to countries if such
choice does not lead to negative effects including at international level, i.e. for
the relations between countries’ industries and communities, creators and
users.
The second argument is well known: it is that a single level of IP protec-
tion is not always suited for all of the world’s countries.2This is not speciﬁc
to design protection. Countries are at different stages of development, are
IP importers or exporters and may need more or less IP protection.
Provided all countries are at more or less the same level of development,
and are net exporters of IP, and the vast majority of those reviewed in this
book are, they can adopt the same IP laws. Provided every country even-
tually aspires to an elevated level of development, once they reach it, such a
model can be adopted. In the meantime, articles 25 and 26 of the TRIPs
Agreement (TRIPs) allows them to choose a minimal level of protection.
12.2 Historical Lessons from International Efforts
As the national chapters of this book show, there were and still are wide
divergences between countries in the way they deal with the interface, not
only between the countries but also during different periods in each indi-
vidual country. This was, and still is, at the origin of the difﬁculty in
attempting to reach a solution to the interface in international conventions.
12.2.1 International Efforts
12.2.1.1 Sui Generis Design Right
International efforts on a sui generis right for designs were launched by the
Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI) in 1956.3 In 1958,
2 Kingsbury, ‘International harmonisation of designs law’, 385: ‘The concept that there exists a
single solution to designs protection that would be optimal across all jurisdictions is itself
highly challengeable. What constitutes an appropriate designs regime will vary considerably
across jurisdictions, depending on factors including level of development, indigenous design
requirements, competition and tax regimes, and trade policy.’ And ibid., 395.
3 The 1956 ALAI congress took a unanimous resolution stating that there should be a study
at international level on the topic between the international organisations. See 7th edn
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the three unions (Berne, Paris andGeneva) agreed to forma groupof experts
tasked to ﬁnd a solution for the protection of designs at international level. In
1959, experts from twenty-one countries agreed that a sui generis right was
necessary but did not agree on how the interface with copyright law would
work, thus leaving countries to choose between cumulation and
demarcation.4 They also thought that cumulation would not pose many
problems.5 The group discussed subject-matter, protection requirements
and formalities, but reached no agreement on those.6 They only agreed on
minimal aspects, mainly duration (minimum ten years) and prohibition of
exact reproduction.7
Meanwhile, the question of a sui generis right for designswas debated at the
1960 congress of the Association Internationale pour la Protection de la
Propriété Intellectuelle (AIPPI) and again in 1964 with a text unanimously
adopted at the AIPPI Tokyo congress in 1966. This text in short states that:
the object of protection of a design right is appearance and it can be two-
dimensional (2D) and three-dimensional (3D); cumulation is possible but
not mandatory; and if a design or model shows no creative effort or if it is
exclusively dictated by a technical necessity, registration can be refused. The
designs and models must be deposited to be protected and there can be
secrecy for one year. Protection is for a minimim of ten years and is against
exact reproduction and imitation.8The experts again did not think cumula-
tion would create many difﬁculties.9 Incidentally, the text closely resembles
that ofTRIPs adopted thirty years later, showing no further progress to reach
séance de travail, ‘La protection des œuvres des arts appliqués et des dessins et modèles’,
in ALAI (ed.), Travaux de la Réunion d’Amsterdam (1956), p. 63 at 67.
4 M.-A. Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays duMarché
Commun (La Haye: Mouton, 1968), pp. 299–300; W. Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts
appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt communautaire enmatière de dessins et modèles
industriels’ (1978) 97 RIDA 4 at 67; S. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights,
National and International Protection (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1975),
pp. 836–7, also stating that UNESCOwas involved, citing UNESCO Report (1959) XII,
no. 1 Copyright Bulletin.
5 Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, pp. 836–7.
6 Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, p. 837.
7 Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, p. 301; Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un
dépôt communautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 71.
8 See Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, pp. 302–6; Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, pp. 868–9; J.
Reichman, ‘Design protection in domestic and foreign copyright law: From the Berne
Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976’ (1983) Duke Law Journal 1143 at 1166.
Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt communau-
taire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 67–9, also mentions the parallel work
(draft model law) of the Milan Institute of Comparative Law which met on this issue in
1964, 1965 and 1968.
9 S. Ricketson and J. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 469.
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agreement on more details at international level. While it does not appear in
the text, the experts generally preferred relative to absolute novelty.10BIRPI
andWIPOalso came upwith amodel design law in 1970.11Lastly, the latest
AIPPI resolution on the interface advocates cumulation, and a very broad
one at that, butwithoutmanymoredetails (in short the scope of copyright for
industrial products should not be different from that for other copyright
works, and designs solely dictated by technical function can be excluded).12
However, even if there is a WIPO model law, it is optional and the
design protection as enshrined at international level in TRIPs is extremely
ﬂexible and thus could lead countries to adopt the ‘right type’ of sui generis
design protection which, if coupled with the ‘wrong type’ of copyright
protection,13 will not produce the desired effects.
12.2.1.2 Copyright Protection of Designs
Copyright protection of designs has encountered even slower and more
meagre progress and this since the nineteenth century and both at inter-
national and regional level.
Since the beginning, the issue was a thorny one as there were great
differences in how to approach the protectionofworks of applied art between
Bernemembers, mainly between France on one hand and Italy, theUK and
Japan on the other. The question was not raised until the revision of the
Berne Convention in 1908, and only one article applying national treatment
to works of art was adopted. However, this led to a serious imbalance since
nationals of countries applying unity of art or full cumulation would not be
protected in countries with a demarcation system and vice versa. Therefore,
some countries gave reservations on this article so they could escape this
imbalance.14 During the Rome revision in 1928, countries could not ﬁnd a
compromise and thus nothing changed.15A solution byway of articles 2(7)
and 7(4) was found in Brussels in 1948 albeit with difﬁculty16 and
10 Pérot-Morel,Les Principes de Protection desDessins etModèles dans les Pays duMarchéCommun,
p. 302. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, p. 832 also reporting that the patent
approach for designs was criticised for its stringent criteria including absolute novelty.
11 BIRPI and WIPO, Model Law for Developing Countries on Industrial Designs, Geneva,
1970. See Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, p. 871; Reichman, ‘Design
protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1143 at 1165; Ricketson and
Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 469.
12 See Resolution on question 231, Seoul Congress, 2012, available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/231/RS231English.pdf.
13 Or vice versa: the ‘wrong type’ of design protection with the ‘right type’ of copyright
protection. For more on this, see below, sections 12.3–12.5.
14 Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, pp. 456–7.
15 Ibid., pp. 458–60.
16 M.Oppenheimer, 12th report, ‘Dessins et modèles d’art appliqué’, ALAI (ed.), Travaux
de la réunion d’Amsterdam, 1956, p. 149 at 151.
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remained unchanged until the last revision in 1971.17 Because no solution
was found to entirely resolve the problem, countries’ choice was limited to
embarking on bilateral negotiations.18
ALAI did work in parallel. ALAI was always in favour of copyright
protection for works of applied art19 even in the presence of a sui generis
design right.20Over the course of twenty-seven years, from 1956 to 1983,
ALAI accumulated the declarations and resolutions, in the main repeat-
ing its attachment to a copyright protection of works of applied art, even if
a sui generis design right is adopted.21However, while ALAI was in favour
of cumulation, it did not specify its form (partial or full).
12.2.2 EU Efforts
EU design law is the most harmonised regional design regime in the
world. It is an amazing feat since it saw the light of day from a wild
patchwork of design laws and some countries had no design law at all
17 Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 461; Ladas,
Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, pp. 833–4.
Article 2(7) reads: ‘Subject to the provisions of Article 7(4) of this Convention, it shall
be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the extent of the
application of their laws to works of applied art and industrial designs andmodels, as well
as the conditions under which such works, designs and models shall be protected. Works
protected in the country of origin solely as designs andmodels shall be entitled in another
country of the Union only to such special protection as is granted in that country to
designs and models; however, if no such special protection is granted in that country,
such works shall be protected as artistic works.’
Article 7(4) reads: ‘It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to
determine the term of protection of photographic works and that of works of applied art in
so far as they are protected as artistic works; however, this term shall last at least until the
end of a period of twenty-ﬁve years from the making of such a work.’
18 J. L. Duchemin, 11th report, ‘La protection internationale des œuvres des arts
appliqués’, ALAI (ed.), Travaux de la réunion d’Amsterdam, 1956, p. 141 at 146; M.
Poirier, 9th report, General report established for the special commission, ‘The protec-
tion of works of the applied arts and of designs and models’, ALAI (ed.), Travaux de la
réunion d’Amsterdam, 1956, p. 130 at 135.
19 Duchemin, ‘La protection internationale desœuvres des arts appliqués’, 143;M. Poirier,
‘The protection of works of the applied arts and of designs and models’, 135.
20 M. F. Hepp, ‘La protection légale des produits des arts appliqués dans le domaine
international’, ALAI (ed.), Travaux de la réunion de 1958, p. 211 at 216.
21 Ibid., referring to the 1957ALAI declaration to keep copyright even if a special protection
of designs is adopted at international level; at the Munich congress of 1963, ALAI
adopted a resolution on the interface and constituted a study commission on works of
applied art but then not much followed. See Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des
Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays duMarché Commun, p. 307; in 1965 ALAI was in favour of
cumulation: see Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un
dépôt communautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 67–9; H. Cohen
Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A com-
parative study’, ALAI (ed.), Travaux de la Réunion de la Mer Egée, 1983, p. 77 at 125
referring to the 1983 resolution declaring the same.
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(Greece).22While EU design law is highly harmonised and has had tremen-
dous success, it nevertheless left the copyright/design interface untouched.
The work at EU level started as early as 1960 with a committee formed
of staff in charge of IP services in the different Member States of the then
EuropeanCommunity and a report on the work of this committee written
by Professor Roscioni. However, there was no follow-up, probably
because the issue was not yet ripe.23 Then the Max Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property Law drafted a model design law24 which was pre-
sented at a symposium in 1990. Another model lawwas also drafted by an
international group of experts in connection with a seminar about design
law held in 1988 in Treviso and was close to the Max Planck draft.25The
European Commission’s proposal for a legal protection of design was
similar to the Max Planck draft in most part26 and the said draft is also
quite close to the text of the Directive and Regulation.27 However, again
the Max Planck draft left the copyright/design interface untouched. The
drafters thought that theMember States’ copyright laws on the topic were
too hard to reconcile,28 with which I can certainly agree. But they also
22 Greece enacted special legislation on the protection of industrial designs andmodels in 1996.
Formoredetails, seeChapter3.Writing adecadebefore the adoptionof theDesignDirective
and Design Regulation, H. Cohen Jehoram insightfully described the situation concerning
design laws in the then EC as follows: ‘In no other ﬁeld of intellectual property do national
legal systems vary so widely as in design protection.’ See H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Cumulative
designprotection:Asystem for theEC?’ (1989)EIPR83.Firth andGrifﬁths alsodescribe the
widely different design laws before the Design Directive in relation to protection require-
ments, term andprocedure:H.Grifﬁths, ‘Overview of developments inEurope on industrial
design protection’ (1993) 4Fordham Intell. Prop.Media&Ent. L.J. 359 at 359–63; A. Firth,
‘Aspects of design protection in Europe’ (1993) EIPR 42 at 42–3.
23 Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, p. 24; Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un
dépôt communautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 67.
24 See Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and
Competition Law, ‘Towards a European design law’, 1991. The draft law was drafted
by Kur, Levin, Beier and Haertel.
25
‘Towards a European design law’, 14.
26 See European Commission, Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design,
Brussels, June 1991, III/F/5131/91-EN, pp. 11 and 144.
27 The system is described in ‘Towards a European design law’, 5 and 6. In short, it adopts a
design approach because the patent approach is suitable for big business but not SMEs
and this is the category that needs an efﬁcient protection of design themost. It is a two-tier
system, i.e. a short (two-year) unregistered right along with a registered right. The right
had a grace period, duration for an initial ﬁve years renewable up to twenty-ﬁve years, and
had a criterion of relative novelty and distinctiveness. Years before, many experts also
were in favour of relative novelty and a grace period: see e.g. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Protection
of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A comparative study’, 106 and
114, reporting interventions by Pérot-Morel and Mout-Bouwman.
28
‘Towards a European design law’, 46–7. G. Dinwoodie, ‘Federalized Functionalism:
The Future of Design Protection in the European Union’ (1996) 24 AIPLA Quarterly
Journal 647, 711–716.
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thought that their proposed design system, which included an unregis-
tered design right, would reduce the problem of the interface to nought.29
Hence it did not have to be resolved. Cumulation would exist in theory
but not in practice. The Commission also wanted to leave copyright
untouched30 and thought the need for copyright would diminish because
of the Community registered and unregistered design rights.31 So both
theMax Planck drafters and the Commission were rather naïve because it
is clear – and this will be discussed in detail below – that if the copyright’s
level of originality is low, even if the design law is attractive, many
designers will not use it since there is no need to register or, if designers
register, their two rights will cumulate and they will obtain double protec-
tion, because of an unresolved interface.
In conclusion, all twenty-eight Member States now have almost iden-
tical substantive national registered design laws and, in addition, every
designer can beneﬁt from the Community unregistered design right
(UCD) andCommunity registered design right (RCD). It is undoubtedly
amajor advancement compared to the period before 1998 and, indirectly,
a major achievement in relation to the interface, as a well-functioning and
balanced design system is crucial to a well-functioning interface, as we
shall see in section 12.3. However, like at international level, the copy-
right/design interface was left unregulated at EU level (in article 17
Design Directive and article 96(2) Design Regulation32), leading most
Member States to keep their systems of full cumulation, partial cumula-
tion or demarcation. Only one thing is clear: that following the CJEU
decision in Flos, the term of copyright protection for works of applied art
may not be shorter than the full term, i.e. seventy years p.m.a.,33 and this
despite the relatively clear or at least very broad language of article 17
Design Directive. What is less clear following the same decision is
29 Ibid., 5: ‘the problem of the relation between design law and copyright law that has led to
enormous difﬁculties in all countries, is to be mitigated by offering an efﬁcient design
protection so that the need for an additional protection will be conﬁned to exceptional
cases’; and at 55: draft provisions ‘will render it unnecessary for designers to have much
resort to copyright law’.
30 Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design, p. 142. 31 Ibid., p. 151.
32 Article 17 reads: ‘A design protected by a design right registered in or in respect of a
Member State in accordance with this Directive shall also be eligible for protection under
the law of copyright of that State as from the date onwhich the design was created or ﬁxed
in any form. The extent to which, and the conditions under which, such a protection is
conferred, including the level of originality required, shall be determined by each
Member State.’ Article 96(2) reads: ‘2. A design protected by a Community design
shall also be eligible for protection under the law of copyright of Member States as
from the date on which the design was created or ﬁxed in any form. The extent to
which, and the conditions under which, such a protection is conferred, including the
level of originality required, shall be determined by each Member State.’
33 Case C-168/09, Flos SpA v. Semeraro Casa & Famiglia SpA [2011] ECDR 161, para. 39.
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whether the level of originality for all designs (registered and unregis-
tered) is harmonised.34
12.3 Comparing National Experiences: Similarities,
Differences and Trends
The foremost and strongest commonality in the countries’ experiences is
that a badly designed design law is not going to help the interface. This is
because if the system is one of full or partial cumulation with a high level
of originality in the copyright Act and a patent approach in the design Act,
i.e. a strict registered design system, inevitably, designers use the more
protective unfair competition law (if it exists) and/or copyright law, con-
vincing courts to lower the originality level to compensate the inadequate
registered design protection. The pendulum then switches from under-
protection to over-protection.35 This happened in France, the Benelux,
theNordic countries and theUSA at variousmoments of their history. An
adequate level of design protection is ﬁxed now in the EU at least36 so that
such issue is resolved at EU level.
Two other very strong commonalities emerge from the statistics on the
number of design applications and, to a lesser extent, design registrations.37
Granted, it is hard to measure the effects of a piece of legislation.38 In the
case of designs, there are many other factors which can affect design
applications such as industrial ones (sectoral composition, shorter product
lifecycles, industry structure, awareness and knowledge of design rights),
legal ones (legal traditions, legal strength of unregistered rights, wide or
narrow range of IPR options, enforcement regimes, diffuse qualiﬁcation,
existence and efﬁcacy of competing private databases, rise of open source
collaborations) and administrative ones (simplicity and ease of application
procedure and registration cost).39 And there may be others such as the
abolition of copyright formalities making copyright more attractive than
34 Ibid., para. 34. Arguably only unregistered designs must abide by the level imposed by
Infopaq and its progeny. L. Bently, ‘The return of industrial copyright?’ (2012) EIPR 654
at 660ff. SeeChapter 3 (Greece) in this bookwhere it is argued that the issue of originality
has been fully harmonised on the basis of the CJEU’s case law.
35 J. Reichman, ‘Design protection and the legislative agenda’ (1992) 55(2) Law and
Contemporary Problems 281 at 287.
36 It may be argued that a similar situation now exists in Australia as it has adopted a design
law very similar to that of the EU except for the relatively short duration (ten years).
37 See the graphs and the consolidated country tables in the annex at the end of this chapter.
38 J. Schovsbo and S. Teilmann-Lock, ‘Wewantedmore Arne Jacobsen chairs but all we got
was boxes – Experiences from the protection of designs in Scandinavia from 1970 till the
directive’ (2016) IIC 418 at 426.
39 BOP Consulting 2011, ‘Design economics chapter four: Design rights, an international
comparison’, UK Intellectual Property Ofﬁce, p. 14.
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registered design right. Last but not least, the national and global economic
history is also a strong determining factor.40 It is thus verydifﬁcult to analyse
the statistics in a meaningful way, especially to determine the effect of a
change in legislation or judicial trend, without embarking in proper statis-
tical, empirical economic research. This is something which I will not do in
this chapter but leave for future research.
That said, there are some cases where one can venture rather con-
ﬁdently to say that it is hard to see what factors other than the legislation
could have inﬂuenced the statistics. This is the case for design applica-
tions. The ﬁrst striking feature is the huge decrease in national applica-
tions in the EU Member States reviewed in this book41 and the
commensurate enormous rise in EUIPO (former OHIM) applications
from 2003 onwards, which corresponds with the introduction of the
RCD. The Benelux is the most striking illustration in this respect:
applications go from 3,649 in 2003 to a drastic and steady decrease
down to 72 applications in 2014. This general trendmay be explained by
the relatively cheap fees, and easy and quick procedure, including the
possibility of online ﬁling at the EUIPO, considering the right is applic-
able in all the EU Member States.
When one compares the applications by residents and non-residents
for the periods prior to and post design regulation, one sees that resi-
dents tend to carry on ﬁling for national design rights in their country
rather than RCDs while the non-residents tend to prefer ﬁling RCDs.
This may be explained by the fact that most non-residents are probably
companies looking to protect speciﬁc export markets, whereas national
applications are preferred by nationally based non-exporting businesses.42
That said, some of these foreign companies may also prefer to ﬁle
national designs rather than RCDs or in addition to RCDs to prevent
a ‘central attack’. In any case, these statistics show the great success of
the RCD.
The second striking feature is that whereas at ﬁrst sight, generally,
legislative changes do not seem to have affected design applications,
there are some cases where it is hard to see what factors other than the
legislation could have had an inﬂuence. As J. Schovsbo and S. Teilmann-
Lock note about Denmark:
40 Strangely the BOP Consulting 2011 report does not mention this factor.
41 At least those reviewed in this book but the statistics show a very similar trend exists in the
other EU Member States.
42 For similar ﬁndings, see Europe Economics, ‘Economic review of industrial design in
Europe’, Final Report, MARKT/2013/064/D2/ST/OP, January 2015, p. 44 and ‘Legal
review on industrial design protection in Europe under the contract with the Directorate
General Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’, Final Report,
MARKT 2014/083/D, 15 April 2016, pp. 29–30.
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Clearly the shortage of litigation suggests that right holders did not consider
registrations to be important enough to warrant the costs of litigation. Yet, the
fact that parties did engage in registration and chose to incur the costs thereof
indicate some level of impact of the system.Hence, registration practices may be a
useful measure of the effects of the Act. At any rate user behaviour as evidenced by
registration and litigation activity are markers of whether the Act did in fact
produce the effects intended by the legislator.43
The statistics show a similar effect as that described by J. Schovsbo
and S. Teilmann-Lock in other countries. Italy had a very low level of
applications until 1940 when the right’s duration was doubled to four
years, with an increase then, and again a big surge in 1977 when the
term was increased to ﬁfteen years. Equally, there was very little litiga-
tion on registered designs until the implementation of the Design
Directive in Italy. In Sweden, the design Act seems to have had a
huge impact as applications shot from ca. 500 to ca. 3,500 in the
space of one year (1971), stayed around that level until the introduction
of the RCD and then decreased dramatically from 2003 onwards down
to 437 in 2014. It makes sense as Sweden had a stricter level of origin-
ality for a much longer period than Denmark and there is a slight
decrease in applications in the 1990s onwards when Sweden started
to lower its copyright’s originality level. Another interesting example is
Japan. For most of its history (1899 until today), the Japanese interface
was the strictest of all countries reviewed in this book, with a high
hurdle design law (visibility requirement, absolute novelty, principle
of speciality and confusion as infringement test) as well as virtually no
copyright protection for mass-reproducible 3D designs. Despite a slight
decrease in applications since the 1990s, it seems that the Japanese
legislation does not deter applications, which remain very high in
Japan especially in comparison with other big economies such as the
UK, France and Germany. A probable explanation is that designers
have no choice but to register whether the design system is generous or
strict because they cannot fall back on copyright or unfair competi-
tion law.
Nevertheless, it seems, unsurprisingly, as it is the case for each country
examined, that the key driver for the level of design applications is not so
much the law but the economic history44 of each country as well as global
43 Schovsbo andTeilmann-Lock, ‘Wewantedmore Arne Jacobsen chairs but all we got was
boxes’ (2016) IIC 418 at 426.
44 This includes the decline in manufacturing as is apparent in France, Germany and the
UK after the Second World War, with a much bigger decline in the UK compared to
France and Germany. See BOP Consulting 2011, ‘Design economics chapter four:
Design rights, an international comparison’, 15–17. Other reasons why the UK could
have fewer applications compared to France and Germany are: a weaker awareness of
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economic history, especially world wars and world recessions.45The most
striking examples are Australia and Japan, which have known sustained
economic booms; the continuous general upward trend of design applica-
tions for these countries seems to reﬂect this economic success. This is also
shown, generally, in the amount of domestic applications over time com-
pared to foreign ones. Also, generally, smaller markets receive fewer appli-
cations, so the Nordic countries, the Benelux and Greece have constantly
lower numbers of applications than Germany, France, the UK and
Japan.46 Italy is an outlier here as numbers never reach 10,000 and are
more often, on average, between 4,000 and 6,000. The USA is an outlier
too, as numbers only pick up and continuous grow at the end of the 1970s
(before that the number of applications was between 5,000 and 10,000
maximum). Several factors, unrelated to change in the statutory law as
such, explain this surge in design patent applications: (1) more favourable
case law; (2) faster turn-around times at the USPTO; (3) the USPTO
grants the vast majority of design applications; and (4) increase in the
application and thus registrations for design patents on computer icons.47
When one compares the number of applications with the number of
registrations per country, the number of registrations is quite close to the
number of applications even if obviously it is lower. This is because the
procedural aspects in most countries are straightforward and examina-
tion formal, i.e. not substantive. Two interesting examples are the USA
and Japan. In these two countries, the contrast between applications and
registrations is far starker, owing to the substantive examination of
design applications. At all times except between the 1970s and now,
there is a huge difference between the number of applications and the
design law among designers; less favourable procedural aspects such as no simpliﬁed
procedure for short-term designs; no online ﬁling; higher registration fees; higher enfor-
cement costs and the courts’ less IP-friendly attitude; and one substantive law aspect,
namely that unlike other countries, there is a national unregistered design right. See ibid.,
17–34. The UK introduced online ﬁling on 30 September 2015.
45 For a consideration of this in Italy, see Chapter 8.
46 Yearly design application ﬁgures look roughly like this. In the Benelux, the peak was
around 3,500. The Nordic countries have between 1,000 and 4,000 on average depend-
ing on country. Greece peaks at 2,000. By contrast, France, Germany and the UK post-
war applications are generally around the 10,000mark on average; Australia’s application
numbers have always been growing, from zero to ca. 7,000 at present; Japan peaks at ca.
60,000 and has on average around 30,000 applications.
47 M. Leaffer, presentation at ALAI Congress, Rome, 15–16 September 2016. See also J.
Reichman, ‘Design protection after the copyright act of 1976: A comparative view of the
emerging interim models’ (1983) 31 Journal of the Copyright Society 267 at 364 stating:
‘Since 1974 however the US has had a better functioning design patent law in the sense
that it now better covers 3D objects not covered by copyright law via a less stringent non-
obviousness condition.’ See also Reichman, ‘Design protection and the legislative
agenda’, 285, mentioning more favourable case law since the 1980s.
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number of registrations: only about a third of designs get registered in
Japan and about half in the USA. However, it does not seem to have
deterred applications in Japan, the probable explanation being that
designers have no choice, having no recourse to copyright or unfair
competition. In the USA, examination became far less stringent at the
start of the 1970s and the statistics show a corresponding increase in
applications and registrations, which is explained partly because of that,
as stated in the previous paragraph. And the test for works of applied
art to acquire copyright protection was also a little less stringent than
in Japan, probably explaining at least partly the lower level of design
applications. Thus a strict procedural system, i.e. one with substantive
examination such as the Japanese one (and the US one before the
1970s), shows that it lowers drastically the number of registrations
compared to other countries which have a formal check, where the
number of applications is close to the number of registrations
(Germany, Greece, France, the Benelux, Italy).48 This shows that the
law has a strong effect in lowering the number of registrations. The
experience of the USA also seems to show that if the substantive exam-
ination is replaced by a more lax examination, applications increase.
Leaving the statistical analysis and coming back to the legal analysis
alone, differences but also common trends exist in the mechanisms used
to regulate the interface. The countries can be classed in two broad
categories, depending on the period: the full cumulation system on the
one hand and the partial cumulation and demarcation systems on the
other hand. The partial cumulation and demarcation systems use ﬁrst a
mechanism or test to pass at the level of protection requirements in order
to limit the number of designs which can obtain copyright protection. In
the main, two tests emerge as ‘winners’ over time: a higher level of
originality via a criterion of artistic value or merit (be it judged by experts
(Denmark, Italy, Germany and the UK at times), the (educated) public
(UK and Germany at times) or the courts themselves (Japan, Australia));
and the separability test (Italy and USA). Other tests were proposed by
the literature and sometimes adopted by the legislature or courts but were
abandoned for their inadequacy (such as intention in the UK, Australia
and the Netherlands) or simply pre-empted by authority (other tests
48 TheNordic countries also had a substantive examination until the implementation of the
Design Directive but only Sweden shows a similar pattern as the USA and Japan.
Australia and the UK had substantive examination at times (Australia 1906–2003) and
formal examination at other times (Australia 2003–present), and show a similar trend in
the difference between the number of applications and the number of registrations, albeit
less pronounced than that of the USA and Japan.
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proposed in Italy and France were ‘crushed’ by the overwhelming inﬂu-
ence of respectively E. Piola Caselli and E. Pouillet49).
The full and partial cumulation systems also vary in their regulation of
the conﬂicts or clashes caused by the overlap. They range from no
mechanism to some to many. In France, the interface is not regulated at
all at legislative level but courts often align the copyright framework with
the design framework in some troublesome areas, namely ownership and
exploitation contracts. In Japan, Norway and Sweden, courts sometimes
use a narrower scope of protection if the design is functional. In the
Benelux, there is alignment for ownership and duration at legislative
level; in Japan the ownership rules are aligned. In the UK and Australia,
over the years, the legislatures adopted a detailed regulation of the inter-
face in relation to ownership, rights, defences and duration.
Yet another interesting emerging aspect is that some countries’ legis-
latures always wanted demarcation or partial cumulation and never full
cumulation, namely the UK, Australia and Japan. These countries
grappled with how to do it, so did not think it was impossible – unlike
France, which adopted unity of art by giving up trying to ﬁnd an interface
after deciding that all criteria were ﬂawed.
These evaluations lead us to two main interim conclusions. First, even
if it is not the only factor, legislation does often have an important effect
on the success of the design regime and of its interface with copyright.
Secondly, there have been and still are very big differences between
countries in the way they regulate the interface. As we shall see, such
entrenched national positions owed to legal cultures are probably the
biggest hurdle to overcome before a single copyright/design interface
model can be adopted at regional let alone international level.
12.4 Possible Models and Criteria
As we have seen in section 12.3, a deeper statistical analysis needs to be
done to have a conclusive account of the relative impact of the several
factors inﬂuencing the level of design applications, which is beyond the
scope of this book. What can be done at this stage is compare the success
and failure of the different models (section 12.4.1) and of the different
49 Y. Gaubiac and A.-E. Khan conﬁrmed to me that Pouillet had a lot of prestige and
inﬂuence and thus also a lot of followers. Gaubiac adds that it is really the arguments in
favour of the thesis which were decisive and shared by many protagonists. Reichman,
‘Design protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1154–5, 1159, also mentions
‘Pouillet and his followers’. Note that according to Z. Algardi, Disegno Industriale e Arte
Applicata (Milan: Giuffrè, 1977), pp. 65–6, Pouillet was anticipated by Huard, so
Pouillet was not the ﬁrst to propose the theory of unity of art.
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criteria used to regulate the interface (section 12.4.2) by reviewing the
legal history and by examining arguments developed by the literature and
the courts.
12.4.1 The Models: Copyright or Sui Generis Design Right(s), Artistic
Property or Industrial Property, or Both?
For a long time, there were heated discussions about whether designs
should be classiﬁed as part of intellectual or instead industrial property
law.50 Design law as a branch of industrial property originates from the
French 1806 Act, which was copied by other countries afterwards.51
Before that time, copyright protected designs and models, as for instance
in the UK. So the classiﬁcation of designs as industrial property can be
said to be a historical accident.52 The French courts then on the basis of
this law made a differentiation between artistic and industrial designs.53
They also required novelty andmore generally the patent approach rather
than the copyright approach, and thenmost European countries followed
this example.54 That being said, because of the hybrid nature of 3D
design which combines function and aesthetics, the grant of such indus-
trial property protection may have happened anyway later in another
country. So maybe it is only a historical accident that it happened in
France at that very speciﬁc point in time.
This division is now enshrined in international instruments and it is
clearly difﬁcult to go backwards now even if the Paris Convention and
TRIPs still give a choice between the two types of property rights.55More
convincingly, it seems fairer to have both systems so that designers can
choose which one suits their needs best. This is because the ﬁeld of design
varies enormously, from 2D to 3D, and from fashion design (which is
quickly outdated) to other more lasting designs such as the Tripp-Trapp
or Le Corbusier chairs.56 A deposit system is necessary to provide
50 Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, para. 483, p. 828. 51 Ibid., p. 829.
52 Ibid., p. 829. 53 Ibid., p. 830. 54 Ibid., p. 830.
55 Conﬁrming this for the Paris Convention, see S. Ricketson, The Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
p. 487, n. 11.20.
56 Cohen Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A
comparative study’, 107, reporting intervention by Duchemin (everyday thousands of
designs are created but the vast majority will never be exploited; one should not simply
put the two systems, i.e. industrial property and copyright, as antagonistic to protect
designs, as there are many shades (i.e. potential systems between copyright and industrial
property) in between, so to speak, which correspond better to the reality); Cohen
Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A com-
parative study’, 121, reporting intervention by Levin. (For M. Levin, formal require-
ments (i.e. registration, cost, etc.) for designs do not ﬁt the designers’ needs as they are
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industry and third parties with certainty but the system must take into
account the interest of small creators too57 and thus provide an unregis-
tered right. As we have seen in section 12.2.2, this is what drew the Max
Planck Institute to propose not only a choice between copyright and a
registered design right but also an unregistered design right. Submissions
to the European Commission before it issued its Green Paper on the legal
protection of industrial design also stated that the mode of protection, i.e.
registered or not, depends a lot on ‘the nature of the design, type of
product it is applied to and the market in which the product manifests
itself’.58Hence, the toy, textile and fashion industries prefer unregistered
design rights, whereas the manufacturing industries prefer the registered
design right.59
The vast majority of commentators echo this and advocate choice and
potential cumulation between copyright and design right.60 Most com-
mentators also prefer a design approach rather than a patent approach for
the design right, be it registered or not.61 They also believe that the
mostly unaware of the law, e.g. that the design loses novelty if it is made public. So she
stresses that works of applied art must be protected by copyright law.) See also, in a
similar vein, the Johnston Committee’s views, as referred to in Chapter 6, above (UK),
which also thought that cumulation is an adequate system as registration does not serve
the interests of all design industries.
57 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 75.
58 U. Suthersanen, Design Law in Europe (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p. 14.
59 Ibid.
60 For Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt com-
munautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 35, the number of design
registrations is low and depends on the country and sector. The number of registrations
has little relation to the mass of creations generally. Also the costs often outweigh
advantages to register, especially for short-lived designs and for individual designers of
SMEs. So he thinks that copyright is necessary for the small creator so he or she can fall
back on it. P. Combeau, then co-president of the International Commission within
AIPPI studying the protection of designs (stating a report will soon be presented in
Paris), H. Papakonstantinou, A. Argyriadis (adding that it is better without a too-long
term for design protection so as not to stiﬂe follow-on competition) and J. Liedes all
thought a cumulative system is better. See respectively at pp. 108, 112 and 114 in Cohen
Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A com-
parative study’. Very few commentators advocated protecting designs only by copyright.
In 1989, Cohen Jehoram, ‘Cumulative design protection: A system for the EC?’, 87,
proposed a single copyright uniform law to deal with the interface issue so there would no
longer be any interface but reckons it may be toomuch for some countries to abolish their
registered design laws entirely. Six years earlier, he advocated cumulation and suggested
that the European Community should opt for it, especially as most Member States had a
cumulative system. See Cohen Jehoram, ‘Cumulative design protection: A system for the
EC?’, 87. Also, nowadays very few countries protect designs only by copyright; in other
words, most countries have a design act.
61 See e.g. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, p. 832; A. Muhlstein and M.
Wilkinson, ‘Whither industrial design’ (1999–2000) 14 Intellectual Property Journal 1,
criticising the patent approach taken by the US design patent, preferring the UCD and
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copyright protection for designs must be limited so as not to be over-
protective, as the experience of some countries has shown.62 It is only
French commentators and courts, albeit a decreasing majority of them
since the Design Directive, who believe that full cumulation is the only
way to go.63 The reason is historical. As A.-E. Kahn’s chapter recounts,
during the entire nineteenth century, France battled for years with ﬁve
different criteria, trying to ﬁnd the right one to distinguish between
artistic and industrial designs. But it failed and France adopted the
unity of art in 1902.64 French commentators supporting the unity of art
theory thus think it either impossible or subjective and therefore arbitrary
to make this distinction.65 Some also think the unity of art solution is
simple.66 Indeed it avoids the complexity of ﬁxing the boundary between
artistic and industrial designs.67 However, the simplicity of a solution is
not a sufﬁcient argument as simplicity does not by deﬁnition entail
adding that Canada could adopt something similar; also Reichman, ‘Design protection in
domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1223–4, also criticising the US design patent
system. See also AIPPI in section 12.2.1.1 above.
62 Reichman, ‘Design protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1223ff. For
instance, prior to the Benelux design law, Belgium protected designs by copyright with-
out requiring any level of originality.
63 See Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 65. Reichman, ‘Design protection in
domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1159–60, notes, however, that ‘the “unity of art” theory
continues to elicit scepticism even in France . . . Arguably, France and Belgium, which had
sought to rescue artistic designs from the exigencies of patent law, were now converting
copyright law into a de facto industrial property law without the characteristic safeguards of
the industrial property paradigm.’More recently see F.Greffe,Propr. industr. 2013, chron. 4.
A. Lucas,H.-J. Lucas andA. Lucas-Schloetter,Traité de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, 4th
edn (Paris: Lexis-Nexis, 2012), n. 94, p. 109, however, recognise that full cumulation
undermines the coherence of authors’ rights and industrial property. However, P. Y.
Gautier, Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, 7th edn (Paris: PUF, 2010), n. 100, p. 120, criticises
the theory and P. Kamina, ‘Fasc. 1155: Règles Spéciﬁques a Certaines Oeuvres – Arts
appliqués’, JurisClasseur Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, 2016, J. Passa, Droit de la
propriété industrielle, 2nd edn (Paris: LGDJ, 2009), pp. 6ff, and A.-E. Kahn, ‘Un an de droit
de lamode’,CommunicationCommerce électronique no. 9, Septembre 2016, chron. 10, are not
for total cumulation but full or partial cumulation.
64 Reichman, ‘Design protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’ reports at 1159 that
‘the soundest writers caution that it was a victory by default rather than by persuasion’.
65 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 45, 63, 73; Cohen Jehoram,
‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A comparative
study’, reporting intervention by A. Francon, 115; Ricketson and Ginsburg,
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, pp. 454–5; Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de
Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché Commun, p. 315.
66 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 46–8.
67 Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 455; Lucas,
Lucas and Lucas-Schloetter, Traité de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, n. 94. Except that
it is not that simple to exclude functional designs according to the application of the idea/
expression dichotomy, which some of these commentators do not acknowledge.
436 Estelle Derclaye
SA
PL
E
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19867-8 — The Copyright/Design Interface
Edited by Estelle Derclaye 
More Information
www.cambridge.org© Cambridge University Press
adequacy. Often a complex situation, such as that concerning designs,
needs a sophisticated answer. Also I do not think that it is impossible to
ﬁnd a workable criterion, as will be shown in the following sections. I
would therefore reject it in view of the obvious overprotection and sub-
sequent stiﬂing of competition it leads to and on the basis of some
countries’ actual experience proving this.
Advocates of demarcation are rare and are not surprisingly coming from
countries which have had the system, such as Italy and Japan. However, it
has become quite clear that forcing registration with no choice for either a
limited copyright or unregistered design right protection is unfair to many
designers, namely those whose designs are short-lived and donot justify the
expense, thus those mainly created by individuals and SMEs.
In conclusion, it seems clear, and the experience of the European Union
has nowproved it,68 that a cumulative systemof some sort rather than either
copyright only or registered design right only is the best way to accommo-
date all the different design sectors. What the EU system has not done but
the experience of many EUMember States prior to the EU design system
has shown is that since the interface is concerned with two branches of the
IP system – copyright and design laws – one cannot envisage regulating the
interface by tweaking, ﬁxing or tinkering with only one of the two systems:
the two have to be dealt with in a holistic way.69
The next problem is therefore to determine how the two, or possibly
three, rights interact with each other; in other words, how to regulate the
copyright/design interface.
12.4.2 The Criteria to Fix the Boundary of the Interface
Over the years, countries have toyed with a variety of criteria to ﬁx the
boundary between artistic and industrial designs, i.e. the subject-matter
68 In 2016, the European Commission commissioned a report on the status of design law in
the EU. The purpose of the study was to ﬁnd out in the main if the harmonised and
unitary design system in the EU works well or whether further harmonisation or changes
are required. See ‘Legal review on industrial design protection in Europe’. The report
found that both the level of harmonisation and the functioning of internal market in
relation to goods embodying designs have been achieved but also that there are areas
where the smooth functioning of the internal market has not been achieved. See ibid.,
2016, 11. For instance, registration and administration costs are usually cheap; there is
less delay than with multi-jurisdictional applications; and the ﬁling/grant success rate has
been overwhelming. Ibid., 13. However, some notions such as those of design, individual
character, industrial sector, functionality, disclosure and the scope of protection need
further clariﬁcation at legislative level. That said, harmonisation should carry on via the
EUIPO andCJEU and national courts should carry on aligning their case lawwith that of
EUIPO and CJEU. Ibid., 12–14.
69 As explained in Chapter 4 (Scandinavia).
A Model Copyright/Design Interface 437
AM
PL
E
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19867-8 — The Copyright/Design Interface
Edited by Estelle Derclaye 
More Information
www.cambridge.org© Cambridge University Press
of protection. Some criteria have proved inadequate (12.4.2.1), whereas
some, if not perfect, have proved more suitable (12.4.2.2). In addition,
countries have also used different legal mechanisms to regulate the inter-
actions between the different rights (these will be examined in detail in
section 12.5). When I refer to one of the legal systems reviewed in this
book, I automatically refer, without adding a footnote, to the contribu-
tors’ chapters for more detail. Also, as a reminder, the criterion to ﬁx the
borderline applies in addition to the normal copyright protection require-
ments, i.e. that only original expressions are protectable.
First of all, it seems clear that ﬁxing the border is really only necessary, in
the main, for 3D designs. Designers of 2D designs have been allowed to
cumulate copyright and design rights inmost countriesmost of the time (e.g.
even in partial cumulation and demarcation countries such as the UK,
Australia and Italy in most cases, although not always in Japan). The
monopoly is much less powerful on a 2D design since it does not concern
a functional object but its ‘decoration’. The only problem is to demarcate the
border between 2D and 3D designs, but this is not insurmountable. In the
UK, the case law developed well and the tests are now well established. The
distinction is more precisely between non-functional surface decoration and
functional surface decoration. Surface decoration is excluded from UK
unregistered design right (UKUDR) and covers not only 2D designs but
also 3D designs which are decorating the object.70 Some 2D designs can be
excluded because they are mass-produced. This was the case in the UK
with, for example, carpets and wallpaper as per the Copyright (Industrial
Process and ExcludedArticles) (No. 2)Order 1989, at 2(b), which provided
that an article is meant to bemade by an industrial process (and therefore its
duration reduced to twenty-ﬁve years from ﬁrst marketing71) if ‘it consists of
goods manufactured in lengths of pieces, not being hand-made goods’.
70
Mark Wilkinson v. Woodcraft Designs [1998] FSR 63, 72–3 (‘The expression “surface
decoration” in section 213(3) and in section 51 is apt to include both decoration lying on
the surface of the article (for example, a painted ﬁnish) and decorative features of the
surface itself (for example, beading or engraving)’). Jo-Y-Jo Ltd v. Matalan Retail Ltd
[2000] ECDR 178 (embroidery was surface decoration since it was comprised of stitches
added to the garment after it was made). A. Fulton Co. Ltd v. Grant Barnett & Co. Ltd
[2001] RPC 257 (the seams at the edges and corners of an umbrella case were not surface
decoration). Dyson Ltd v. Qualtex (UK) Ltd [2006] RPC 31, paras. 80, 81 and 83 (there
was no reason why the decoration should not come into existence with the surface.
Surface decoration can be in 3D. Surface features which had signiﬁcant function should
not be regarded as ‘surface decoration’). In Australia, there remains uncertainty whether
embroidered designs are 2D or 3D. The last case on this issue held they were 2D as they
were not part of the shape of garment, but the previous case did not give such a clear-cut
answer. See Australian chapter.
71 Section 52 UK Copyright Act prior to 2016. Mass-produced 2D designs of primarily
artistic character such as book jackets and postcards were, however, excluded from s. 52’s
application.
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12.4.2.1 Inadequate or Unworkable Criteria
1. A ﬁrst criterion is that of destination. It was proposed by some
commentators in Italy before the adoption of the separability doc-
trine and was the prevailing theory in France before the adoption of
the unity of art theory. According to this criterion, if the designed
object’s (essential) destination is aesthetic then it is protected by
copyright, but if it is industrial or functional then it is protected by
design right. There is an evident problem with the criterion; it occurs
when the object has no predominant destination or utilitarian pur-
pose but is both aesthetic and functional.72Another objection is, why
should copyright protection be refused to a beautiful object simply
because it is utilitarian?73 Therefore, commentators are generally
against the criterion of destination and currently none of the legal
systems reviewed in this book are using it.74
2. The designer’s intention has been used in the UK and Australia’s
copyright legislation respectively in 1911 and 1912, and was most
famously applied in the King Features v. Kleeman decision.75 In the
USA, the designer’s intention may in some cases determine the out-
come of the separability test. It was also proposed by some Italian
commentators before the adoption of the separability test. In the UK,
the Gregory Committee was against this criterion because making the
protection of copyright turn upon the intention of the artist can lead to
inequitable results. It can be used strategically in order to gain the
protection that the designer wants rather than the one suited to the
object. Indeed, the author can also always claim a posteriori that he or
she wanted to do something aesthetic. Taking the user’s perspective,
he or she can almost never be certain of the author’s intention, making
the criterion almost always work in favour of the author. Therefore,
the user will always have to err on the side of caution and refrain from
using the work, even if the author’s intention was not to create a work
of art. The criterion was more generally criticised and abandoned in
Australia but is still found in the UK for sculptures,76 although not
works of artistic craftsmanship, the latter constituting the vast majority
of 3D designs.
72 Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, p. 455.
73 Cohen Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A
comparative study’, 108.
74 Perot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, 319; Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un
dépôt communautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 93.
75
King Features Syndicate Inc. and Betts v. O&M Kleeman Ltd [1941] AC 417, HL.
76 See Lucasﬁlm v. Ainsworth [2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch), aff’d by [2011] UKSC 39.
However, it is not the artist but the judge who decides according to a list of criteria.
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3. The criterion of the status of the author was used in France before the
adoption of the unity of art theory. If the author was a manufacturer or a
craftsman, design law applied, but if he was an artist, copyright law
applied. It is also used for works of artistic craftsmanship in the
Australian Burge v. Swarbrick case, even if arguably not in isolation.77
However, like the criterion of destination, the criterion does not work if
themanufacturer or craftsman is also an artist or when the artist transfers
his or her rights to a company.78
4. The French also experimented with the criterion of the method of
reproduction. The Italian literature also proposed it. Japan arguably
still uses it. According to this criterion, handcrafted items were copy-
rightable while works reproduced by mechanical means were not.79
The criterion was famously rejected in the UK in George Hensher v.
Restawile,80 even if the House of Lords agreed it could be an indicator
to determine craftsmanship. The criterion has been criticised as
inequitable and arbitrary.81 Indeed, even if it can arguably be less
frequent, a work can be very artistic even if it is not handmade.
5. Another criterion the French experimented with was that of the second-
ary or accessory character of the aesthetic features in the work
embodying the design.82 The Italian literature also suggested it.
However, it is impossible to use when form follows function as the
aesthetic features of the work do not have a secondary or accessory
character.
6. Last but not least, the criterion of artistic merit or value has been
used a lot over the years and is still used by countries such as the UK,
Germany, Italy and Japan. The French also used this criterion as a
last resort after having tried all the others.83 Because of its subjectivity,
France rejected it to adopt the unity of art theory. Indeed, a criterion
based on artistic value leaves the decision to the whim of judges (or the
experts or the public) and thus is highly subjective, inevitably leading
to inconsistent decisions. It is therefore uncertain and bad for creators
77 (2007) 232 CLR 336.
78 Y. Gaubiac, ‘La théorie de l’unité de l’art’ (1982) 111 RIDA 2 at 46–7.
79 Ibid., 44–5.
80
George Hensher Ltd v. Restawile Upholstery (Lancs) Ltd [1975] RPC 31 (HL).
81 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 63.
82 Gaubiac, ‘La théorie de l’unité de l’art’, 46–7.
83 Ibid., 48–9;M.-A. Pérot-Morel, ‘Speciﬁc protection of designs and its relation to protec-
tion by copyright in French law’, inH.Cohen Jehoram (ed.), Speciﬁc Design Protection and
Copyright in Benelux and Dutch Law (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1976), p. 49; G. Finniss, ‘The
theory of “unity of art” and the protection of designs and models in French law’ (1964)
46 Journal of the Patent Ofﬁce Society 615 at 621.
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and users alike.84 This is perhaps most famously illustrated by the still
ongoing ‘saga’ relating to works of artistic craftsmanship in the UK,
where there is no agreed criterion at Supreme Court level but a
plurality of different ones (although it seems lower courts are now
settling for the criterion of artistic merit judged by a substantial part
of the public85). Italy had its ‘Le Corbusier saga’which ended with the
Supreme Court holding in 2015 that artistic merit was to be judged by
experts (museums and the like).86 Nevertheless, whether it is the
judge, the experts or the public deciding whether a work is artistic or
not, it is clear that the criterion is subjective and unfair to the designer.
Some young designers may see their designs unfairly refused protec-
tion because they are ahead of their time (just think of VanGogh in the
ﬁeld of painting).87 The criterion of artistic merit or value can there-
fore deﬁnitely not be adopted. In fact, it goes totally against the copy-
right’s principle of originality which categorically rejects such a
criterion. Why then should it be reintroduced for works of applied
art? When a high threshold of originality is set for works of applied art,
it distorts copyright law in the sense that the criterion of originality is
harder to achieve and thus it does not rewardmany authors, whereas it
is the aim of copyright law to foster creativity. The argument according
to which such criterion also has the perverse effect that more mundane
works such a as directories, simple drawings, etc. are protected but not
highly creative 3D works is, however, not valid. It is ﬁne to exclude
highly creative works of applied art from copyright law if artists can fall
back on (an) adequately crafted design right(s).88
84 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 46; Reichman, ‘Design protection
after the copyright act of 1976’, 368.
85 Guild v. Eskandar [2001] FSR 38.
86 See Italian chapter. Marzano criticises the Italian criterion for its possible corruptibility
(having connections helps artists place their work in amuseum) and that not all museums
are equally relevant, e.g. national gallery as opposed to municipal museum of the
designer’s summer residence.
87 See also Oliver Wendel Holmes’ famous rejection of a merit criterion in copyright law in
general in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 US 239, 251–2 (1903):
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves ﬁnal judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke. It may bemore than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of
protection when seen for the ﬁrst time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Many thanks to Jane Ginsburg for pointing this out to me.
88 Reichman, ‘Design protection after the copyright act of 1976’, 369–70.
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Clearly, the ﬁrst ﬁve criteria have been rightfully rejected. The criterion of
artistic merit or value does not stack up either even if it has been used for
years and is still used nowadays in some countries. Surely a more objec-
tive criterion can be found.
12.4.2.2 Possible Workable Criteria
A ﬁrst objective criterion is that of the number of copiesmade. This is the
system that the UK had prior to 1968 and which excluded from copyright
protection works embodying designs made inmore than ﬁfty copies,89 and
that Australia still uses.90This systemwas praised as workable by a French
expert even if she doubted it was the best criterion.91More enthusiasticwas
H. Cohen Jehoram who thought it was ‘a nicely clear cut and arbitrary
system’ which provided maximum certainty.92 An Italian commentator
also found the UK criterion adequate because once the work has been
reproduced so many times it loses its aesthetic value.93 However, it is
doubtful whether this is a valid reason for the adequacy of the criterion.
Rather, it is to do with the fact that, since the object is functional, the
protection should be less strong to prevent unduemonopolisation. It is true
that the criterion of the number of copies is arbitrary but, on the other
hand, contrary to all the others reviewed above, it is not subjective and it is
extremely predictable for both the designer and the public. Presumably it is
sufﬁcient for the artist to stamp the numbers of copies at the back of the
article, e.g. ‘1 of 40’, ‘10 of 100’ or ‘5 of 2,000’, or simply the public can
assume that if an object is available in supermarkets or similar stores it is
produced in more than the amount of copies set out by the legislature. For
2D works such as wallpaper and carpets, like in the UK order of 1989, the
criterion would be lengths or pieces, not the number of copies.94
The main trouble with this criterion is that it is against the Berne
Convention if works of applied art are classiﬁed as artistic works.95 And in
89 See UK chapter, s. 22 of the Copyright Act 1911 and Design Rules of 26 June 1912.
90 See Copyright Regulations 1969, reg. 17. However, it is treated as a non-exhaustive
deeming provision, such that a court might decide that, in a particular case, fewer than
ﬁfty copies would satisfy the criterion if they are made ‘industrially’. See Press-Form Pty
Ltd v. Henderson’s Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 113; Gold Peg International Pty Ltd v. Kovan
Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1521.
91 Perot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, 314–15, 318, still thinking that the best way to deal with the issue of designs is a
system close to the unity of art.
92 Cohen Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A
comparative study’, 97.
93 E. Bonasi Benucci (1958) Riv. Dir. Industriale 426 at 430 and 446–50.
94 See note 95.
95 This does not mean that it is per se impossible to adopt this criterion but, of course, it is
extremely difﬁcult to change the convention so, realistically, one has to work with it.
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a systemof partial cumulation as advocated here,works of applied art have to
be protectable by copyright and thus classed as artistic works. It is possible,
though, to tweak this criterion to reduce the copyright term to twenty-ﬁve
years so that it is compliant with article 7(4) of the said convention. This is
what the UK did with section 52 of the 1988 Copyright Act, which, after
almost thirty years of existence, was repealed in 2016.96 The number of
copies can be set at ﬁfty or whatever number one wants to choose. It could
also be a different number depending on the sector. An additional criterion
can be added to it tomake it less harsh, namely excluding someworks even if
they are reproduced inmore than ﬁfty copies, as theUKdid in its Copyright
(Industrial Process and Excluded Articles) (No. 2) Order 1989:97
a) sculptures, other than casts or models used or intended to be used as models or
patterns to be multiplied by an industrial process, b) wall plaques, medals and
medallions and c) printed matter primarily of literary or artistic character includ-
ing book jackets, calendars, certiﬁcates, coupons, dress-making patterns, greeting
cards, labels, leaﬂets, maps, plans, playing cards, postcards, stamps, trade adver-
tisements, trade forms and cards, transfers and similar articles.
However, if such exclusion is added, we go back to the distinction pro-
blem: what is a sculpture and what is printed matter primarily of literary
or artistic character, as the order phrases the latter as a non-exhaustive
list. Indeed, as reported in the UK chapter, the courts and literature
sometimes struggled to make this distinction.
A system similar to the old section 52 of the UK Copyright Act over-
protects if a number of copies below the number that triggers the sec-
tion’s effect overcompensates the designer because he or she can sue on
both copyright and registered right. This is a risk when one uses such a
criterion unless the law stipulates, like in the UK per section 236 of the
Copyright Act, that infringement of one right gives way to the other if
both rights are infringed. The UK did not have a provision similar to
section 236 for the infringement of registered design right and copyright
but section 52 was combined with the criterion of artistic merit for works
of artistic craftsmanship (in which the vast majority of 3D designs fall),
which reduces the number of cumulation cases. However, we saw that
this criterion was not adequate.
A second possibly workable criterion is separability. Despite its
troubled application in the USA, which has not ended with the
96 See also the similar provisions in Australia: Designs Regulations 1969, reg. 2. The UK
had a similar, but more complex, section prior to s. 52 of the 1988Copyright Act, namely
s. 10 of the 1956 Copyright Act. See UK chapter for more details.
97 SI 1989/1070. See the similar system of the 1956 Copyright Act.
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Supreme Court decision in Varsity Brands,98 the criterion was more
successfully applied in Italy, even if more harshly (i.e. excluding the vast
majority of 3D designs). Some commentators also ﬁnd it more suited
than all the others, among others not surprisingly many Italian
commentators.99 For Pérot-Morel, even if the separability criterion is
difﬁcult to apply, it can give a more adequate protection to such designs
than copyright protection. This leads her to conclude that separability
could be kept in principle as it can conciliate the points of view of
partisans and adversaries of the unity of art theory.100 Reichman praises
separability for its degree of precision and ﬁnds it ‘more successful than
others in drawing the distinction without offending the principle that
forbids discrimination on the basis of merit’.101 It is objective,102 if it is
not travestied into a subjective criterion such as that of artistic value or
merit103 (as some courts have done in Italy) or that of the creator’s
intention, as some courts have done in the USA. Defenders of the separ-
ability criterion also prefer it to the artistic value criterion as it does less
violence to copyright law principles.104
Separability (at least ‘Italian style’) has the additional advantage that it
clearly separates copyright and design protection. There is very rarely
cumulation for 3D designs, so very rarely overprotection. There is also
rarely underprotection: even if the author does not have copyright protec-
tion and does not register his or her design, at least in the EU and the UK,
the author can potentially beneﬁt from the unregistered design right(s) if
the work meets those regimes’ protection requirements.
The current USCopyright Ofﬁce regulations seem tomatch closely the
Italian regime which existed until 2001, in short excluding all entire
98 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F 3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015), aff’d 2017
US Lexis 2026. For a discussion of this decision, see Chapter 9.
99 See e.g. T. Ascarelli, Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali (Milano: Giuffrè,
1960), p. 677; G. Floridia, ‘La protezione del diritto d’autore sulle opere dell’industrial
design’ (1984) Rivista di Dirirtto Industriale, 372ff; D. Sarti, La tutela dell’estetica del
prodotto industriale (Milan: Giuffrè, 1990), p. 26; P. Vercellone, comment under Cass.,
22/10/1956, n. 3806 (1958)Rivista di Diritto Commerciale, 172ff, Franchi v.Arti Graﬁche
Cellerino, pp. 174–5.
100 Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, 318–19.
101 Reichman, ‘Design protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1181. Reichman
wrote in the 1980s when the US case law was not as chaotic as it is now. He also wrote
about the separability doctrine in general and not only how it is applied in theUS courts.
102 Reichman, ‘Design protection after the copyright act of 1976’, 376. It is arguable that
the very purpose of the separability theory is to avoid making value judgements.
103 Reichman, ‘Design protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1121.
104 Reichman, ‘Design protection after the copyright act of 1976’, 369. However, it is
contentious that this is the case especially if the separability test in fact favours certain
kinds of designs over others, namely ornate as opposed to simple. On this, see below.
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shapes of useful articles and considering aesthetic value as an irrelevant
factor. However, unlike Italian courts, the US judiciary has struggled to
interpret the separability requirement. In her chapter, Jane Ginsburg
explains that the Supreme Court’s recent approach to separability
could still pose an intractable line-drawing exercise in some cases,
and thus may well prove unworkable anyway. As a result of this almost
impossible line-drawing exercise, the test may also not avoid being
discriminatory. ‘Form follows function’ objects would be excluded
from copyright protection even if they are very aesthetically pleasing,
and equally or less aesthetically pleasing designs may fall on the (copy)
right side of the line, or, pushing aesthetics aside as this is not an
adequate criterion anyway, if we use the originality criterion, designs
could fall on either side of the line.
P. Goldstein believes that, alternatively, normal copyright criteria,
namely the idea/expression dichotomy (excluding elements dictated by
function), merger doctrine and originality, can do the trick.105 However,
then a lot of designs would fall within copyright’s scope (even form-
follows-function designs106) and be protected for the full term. In effect,
this boils down to the unity of art principle.
Drawing from the lessons of this vast and lengthy experience, is it
possible to draft the contours of a model copyright/design interface?
12.5 A Model Copyright/Design Interface
Amodel copyright/design interface is one which is as clear and simple for
everyone involved so that it entails strong legal certainty and is as
balanced as possible in the sense that there is as little over- and under-
protection as possible. To have a working copyright/design interface, as
we stated in section 12.3, countries’ experiences show thatwe ﬁrst need
an adequate sui generis design right. This means a design law which
does not follow a patent approach (i.e. high fees, absolute novelty, speci-
ality principle, too short a duration), otherwise there is underprotection
and designers revert to unfair competition or to copyright and courts tend
105 P. Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright, 3rd edn (New York: Aspen, 2014), 2015
Supplement, §2.5.3.c. If these criteria work, it is not necessary to use separability;
separability need only be used in the ‘hard’ cases. A. Quaedvlieg also suggested this to
me in view of the relatively adequate way the system functions in the Benelux.
106 This is because lamps, chairs, etc. can come in (quasi?) inﬁnite types of shapes and still
perform their function (allowing lighting, sitting), so almost no shape is dictated by
function except the shape of entirely new products perhaps. Even so, it will be rare.
Consider, for instance, the shape of the very ﬁrst vacuum cleaner ever invented; its shape
might at ﬁrst be thought to be dictated by function but we now know there are also an
almost limitless number of shapes for vacuum cleaners.
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to push the criterion of originality down in order to protect designs, and
then there is overprotection.107
Wehave ascertained that the EUdesign system in terms of its substance
is a (near) adequate model108 and we can therefore adopt its provisions
for the model. We have two possibilities: this unregistered right is copy-
right or it is a new unregistered design right which can be added to
copyright. If it is copyright and protection is based on a criterion such
as separability or the number of copies, it can be rather harsh to small
creators whomay be deprived of any protection and sometimes as soon as
the object is marketed. This is because they cannot rely on an automatic
unregistered design right unfettered by these criteria and often will not
have thought to register at all or to register within the grace period if there
is one (like in the EU). So it seems that taking all designers into account,
big and small, IP-savvy and not, a three-rights system would be best.109
However, this is without taking into account a rule, as the one I propose
below, shortening the term of copyright to twenty-ﬁve years if the number
of copies set out in the legislation is reached. In that situation, and if the
requirements for copyright protection are easy to meet, which is the case
107 This is well illustrated by the Dutch story and the UK legislative changes in 1968 where
cumulation made design registrations fall dramatically. See also Reichman, ‘Design
protection in domestic and foreign copyright law’, 1223ff; ibid., ‘Design protection
after the copyright act of 1976: A comparative view of the emerging interim models’
(1983) 31 Journal of the Copyright Society 267 at 354 and also stating at 364 that since
1974 the USA has had a better functioning design patent law in the sense that it now
better covers 3D objects not covered by copyright law because the Patent Ofﬁce inter-
prets the non-obviousness condition less stringently; Reichman, ‘Design protection
after the copyright act of 1976’, 369, 371; Reichman, ‘Design protection and the
legislative agenda’, 281–5. See also Schovsbo and Teilmann-Lock, ‘We wanted more
Arne Jacobsen chairs but all we got was boxes’ and J. Ginsburg’s chapter in which she
proposes the adoption of a sui generis design right based on the current Vessel Hull
design act.
108 The authors of the report written for the European Commission in 2016 (‘Legal review
on industrial design protection in Europe’) suggested some improvements (in the main
clariﬁcation of some notions). See above, note 68. Some doubt remains as to whether
the scope of protection of the design right is strong enough at least in the UK after the
UK Supreme court decision in PMS v. Magmatic [2016] UKSC 12. The strength of
such scope would thus depend on how the Court of Justice of the European Union
would interpret it when a case is referred to it on this issue.
109 In the same vein, see A. Ohly, ‘Where is the birthday train heading? The copyright
design interface in German law’, in G. Karnell et al., Liber Amicorum Jan Rosen (Visby:
Eddy, 2016), p. 603: ‘A model of graded protection – three years protection against
imitation for unregistered designs, up to twenty-ﬁve years absolute protection with
registration, full copyright term for highly creative designs – is by no means outdated.
On the contrary it takes account of the need to allow future designers the freedom they
need.’ The Commission in its Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design
hinted at this (p. 143): ‘a fair overall protection of industrial design may require the
possibility of invoking, at least in certain cases, copyright protection’.
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in most countries, this makes an unregistered design right redundant.
The proposal thus is to have only registered design right and copyright.
In the correct EU system, whether cumulation between an EU and a
national right is necessary, whether it is the unregistered or regis-
tered design right, is however controversial. The Commission had
taken the view that the national and Community registered rights should
not be cumulative.110 And in fact, this is the case for plant variety rights
(PVR).111A system like the PVR could very well work for designs too. So if
a designer opts for a national registered design, he or she cannot then obtain
aCommunity registered design, but if he or she changes his or hermind, he
or she can convert the national right into a Community one and vice versa.
In order to avoid underprotection, demarcation is out. To avoid over-
protection, a model copyright/design interface means partial
cumulation rather than a total or full cumulation. Having chosen this
approach, another important aspect of a good interface is to have a
simple, precise, objective and non-discriminatory criterion or
criteria so that all designers, especially the non-IP savvy ones, as well
as third parties, can know their rights with relative ease.112 In that respect,
then, as developed in section 12.4, a criterion based on the number of
copies is superior to any other, including one based on separability.
The system would work as follows. It is based on the UK rules regulating
the interface between the registered design right and copyright as it is a good
starting point to ﬁnd a model copyright/design interface, but the proposed
rules are also more reﬁned compared to the UK rules. To start with, the
criterion of the number of copies used in the now repealed section 52 of the
current UKCopyright Act could be adopted.113 If the designer makes more
than the amount of copies set by the legislature, copyright and registered
design right would co-exist for the minimum of twenty-ﬁve years from the
making of the work set by article 7(4) of the Berne Convention (or less if we
were not constrained by the Convention114). This number of copies can be
lower or higher than ﬁfty (the old section 52 stated ﬁfty) and could vary
depending on the design sector. If the designer makes fewer copies than the
110 Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design, p. 138. It had left the cumulation
of the UK unregistered right (UKUDR) with the UCD intact as UKUDR replaces
copyright in some cases. Ibid., p. 139.
111 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety
rights, OJ 1994 L 227/1.
112 Cohen Jehoram, ‘Protection of industrial design, between copyright and design laws: A
comparative study’, 107, reporting intervention by Duchemin.
113 G. Ghidini, ‘Cumulation of copyright with registration protection of products of indus-
trial design: An alternative proposal’, Working Paper, 11 March 2016 (available on
www.ssrn.com), shares this opinion and proposes a system to regulate the interface
based on the old s. 52 of the UK Copyright Act.
114 See below for the ideal term of protection.
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amount set by the legislature, there will be works which can be registered as
designs as well, namely sculptures and works of applied art, and both copy-
right and registered design right could also co-exist if the designer chooses to
register.Arguably, thiswill be less frequent sinceprobably thedesignerwould
notgo through that expense if heor she isnot going tomake thatmanycopies.
UK law is also good as it aligns the provisions on ownership in copyright
and design right regimes.115Thus, ﬁrst, one wouldmake the provisions on
commissioned and employee designs coincide in the two rights. Secondly,
the UK also has the same primary and secondary infringement provisions
for copyright and UKUDR; again, this could be extended to the registered
design right. Thirdly, a system based on section 236 of the UK Copyright
Act would also be good. Section 236 ensures that where a design is
infringed and attracts both UKUDR and copyright, a claimant can only
sue on the basis of copyright. This avoids overprotection116 for what is in
essence the same act of infringement. The rule laid out in section 236 could
be made applicable to the registered design right. But in this case since the
claimant has registered his or her design, it should be the registered design
right that prevails at the level of infringement.Granting a narrower scope of
copyright protection if the design is rather functional (along the lines of
Swedish and Norwegian case law117) could also be a nifty mechanism to
avoid overprotection. Arguably, the idea/expression dichotomy already
plays that role. Finally, all exceptions and excluded subject-matter should
be aligned.Thismeans that copyright law should include a repair exception
or alternatively exclude must-ﬁt and must-match features from its scope.
This system would leave purely functional designs out of copyright protec-
tion and out of registered design right protection if the designer chooses not
to register. This is not leaving a gap since it is ﬁlled by patent law. Last but
not least, one would leave the rights of attribution and integrity untouched
or one could make the right of attribution inapplicable as the UK
Copyright Act did when section 52 was applicable. The contractual pro-
tection of authors which exists in many civil law countries may also have to
be watered down or made inapplicable.
115 See ss. 11, 51, 53, 215, 224, 226, 227, 236, 244A and 244B of the UK Copyright Act
and s. 2 UK Registered Designs Act, some of which were amended by the Intellectual
Property Act 2014. The exceptions are aligned between all design rights but not with
copyright. The Benelux law also aligns ownership provisions.
116 There is a real risk of overprotection here as the infringement tests for copyright and
unregistered design are different, leading to one right not being infringed while the other
could very well be, thereby ‘ﬁlling the protection gap’. The same applies for copyright
and registered design infringements.
117 Although, at EU level, this is now probably conﬂicting with the Painer decision (Case C-
145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH [2011] ECDR 297), this is not
reversible provided counter-legislation is passed.
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As the UK example shows, it is not distorting copyright law to ‘twist’ its
rules to accommodate designs. In fact, the Berne Convention allows it
and there are other works which have a special regime in copyright law
such as computer programs and databases. Borderline cases require
adjusting the rules. This does not mean that the copyright framework is
weakened or no longer coherent.
A good working copyright/design interface also needs an adequate
duration for both copyright and design rights. If the copyright term is too
long, in a similar way as the level of originality being too low, it will
undermine the design rights, and even if it does not have that effect
because the interface criterion works well, the term makes copyright law
arguably overprotective. As the Italian experience shows, if the registered
design right term is too short (e.g. a term of two years or less, and arguably
four is too short too), the right will very rarely be used.
How long should the registered design right last for? For many com-
mentators, ﬁfteen is an adequate number of years for a design right.118
Before the implementation of the Design Directive, this was the term in
Germany, in Italy as of 1977, in the UK from 1907 to 1988, and in the
Benelux and Nordic countries.119 Some also suggested a term no longer
than the patent term.120 That makes sense as many 3D designs are
functional, and in that respect thus closer to inventions than works. The
term could also vary depending on the sector, e.g. a shorter term for the
fashion sector and a longer term for the manufacturing sector.121 This is
somewhat the case in the EU with the Community unregistered design
right but also via the possibility to renew the national or Community
registered right every ﬁve years, up to amaximumof twenty-ﬁve years. So,
in a system which gives the choice between unregistered and registered
design rights, one can vary the term of the registered and unregistered
design rights to match the different sectors’ interests, and allow one to be
transformed into the other after a grace period, as is the case in the EU. In
my proposal, the grace period would function between copyright and the
registered design. In sum, a term of between ﬁfteen and twenty-ﬁve years
118 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 85; W. Cornish, ‘Cumulative
protection for industrial designs’ (1973) 8University of British Columbia Law Review 219
at 242, 243, 245 citing in agreement the Johnston Committee report of 1962, also citing
that a Canadian Commission recommended ﬁve or seven years.
119 During her presentation at the ALAI annual conference in Rome on 15–16 September
2016, D. Lipzicz mentioned that a signiﬁcant number of Latin American countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay also have a ﬁfteen-year term of protection.
120 Cornish, ‘Cumulative protection for industrial designs’, 242.
121 Pérot-Morel, Les Principes de Protection des Dessins et Modèles dans les Pays du Marché
Commun, p. 322.
A Model Copyright/Design Interface 449
SA
MP
LE
Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19867-8 — The Copyright/Design Interface
Edited by Estelle Derclaye 
More Information
www.cambridge.org© Cambridge University Press
for the registered design right would be adequate and arguably the EU
system of renewals provides ﬂexibility to the different designing sectors.
Virtually every expert agrees that the Berne standard copyright term of
life of the author plus ﬁfty years is too long for works of applied art. If one
wants to protect works of applied art as artistic works and wants to respect
international law, then the minimum copyright term must be twenty-ﬁve
years from the making of the work as per article 7(4) of the Berne
Convention.122 But it could be lower than twenty-ﬁve, say ﬁfteen, if the
Berne Convention did not have to be respected or did not apply, i.e. if a
country decided not to classify works of applied art as artistic works. So if
it was felt that twenty-ﬁve years was too long for industrial designs/works
of applied art, an alternative would be to exclude them from copyright
protection and have an unregistered design right lasting less than twenty-
ﬁve years and a registered design right modelled on what we already have
in the EU, ﬁve years renewable to a maximum of twenty-ﬁve years, or, if
this was felt to be too long, amaximumof ﬁfteen years. I am not ruling out
this system but simply then copyright would be replaced by an unregis-
tered design right, and the same rules I propose above in this section to
regulate the interface between copyright and RDR would apply between
the UDR and the RDR. I have a preference for the copyright/RDR inter-
face over the UDR/RDR interface as we already have a well-settled body
of copyright case law to rely on and, as we have seen with the database sui
generis right, new rights create uncertainties. One possibility is to say that
the copyright rules will apply to the newly createdUDR, but inmy view, it
is still a riskier option.
In a partial cumulation scenario, twenty-ﬁve years is certainly enough
since the right is cumulated at least potentially with the registered design
right. If it is not cumulated, whether the duration is adequate is debatable
as any term is. It will be too much for some designs and too little for
others. At the end of the day, as with any IP right, duration is by deﬁnition
arbitrary. For some, it would be a good idea to match the copyright and
design right term to twenty-ﬁve years123 (it was almost the case for artistic
works made in more than ﬁfty copies, or in lengths or pieces in UK law
prior to the repeal of section 52 in 2016). This is certainly a good idea
which works at international level if one wants to keep protecting works of
applied art by copyright, but it is problematic in the EU owing to the
122 In 1992, the Australian Law Reform Commission had recommended this term for any
protection an article would receive. See S. Ricketson, ‘Towards a rational basis for the
protection of industrial design in Australia’ (1994) 5 Australian IP Journal 193 at 207.
123 Duchemin, ‘La protection des arts appliqués dans la perspective d’un dépôt commu-
nautaire en matière de dessins et modèles industriels’, 91.
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Term Directive and the Flos decision. A modiﬁcation of either the case
law or the directive would be in order to allow such alignment.
To sum up, a model copyright/design interface would have two rights:
copyright and registered design right (or alternatively unregistered
design right and registered design right) either only at national level or
leaving a choice of the regional and national level, but once that choice is
made it would not be cumulative, yet it would be reversible (like the
PVR). The system would be a partial cumulation system, based on the
number of copies (or lengths or pieces for 2D designs), with provisions
in all the rights aligned as far as possible. The duration would be no
longer than twenty-ﬁve years for both copyright and the registered right
and the length of the registered right may be set differently depending on
the sectors. A grace period like the one provided in the EU legislative
framework between the UCD and the RCD could work but instead
between copyright and the registered design. This model respects both
Berne and TRIPs but runs counter to EU statutory law and CJEU case
law. This is not problematic since this case law can be overridden by a
legislative initiative. Of course, whether the EU legislature’s agenda will
include this issue in the near or distant future is guesswork.
12.6 Conclusion
The copyright/design interface has been on the agenda of international
organisations and bodies for over a century.Despite years of discussion and
negotiations, almost no progress has been made even at regional level, as
exempliﬁed by the EU treatment of the interface. Countries have rarely
changed their positions (e.g. Japan) or if they have, like France orGreece, it
is because they have had to as required by EU law. Countries’ positions
nowadays still seem entrenched. This has led S. Ricketson and J. Ginsburg
to write that the current Berne text on the issue is probably the most that
can still be achieved at the moment and that the current situation under
which each member remains free to choose which protection to give to
works of applied art under sui generis design laws is unlikely to change in the
near future.124Therefore, trying toﬁnd aworkable interfacemaywell be an
impossible and thus useless task. That may be so at international level, but
it does not prevent individual countries having a go. At EU level it may well
be that the interface will get harmonised ‘by the back door’, i.e. by CJEU
case law ‘generously’ interpreting the current legislative framework rather
than or before the EU legislature acts on it, as it has already done with Flos
124 Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, pp. 465, 469.
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and Infopaq and the subsequent case law on originality.125 What is clear is
that a holistic approach looking both at copyright and design law together
rather than in isolation is needed to solve the problem.126 And this is not
what the CJEUhas done so far; on the contrary, its decisions have arguably
started to undermine the EU design system. But it is never too late to
correct course. My modest hope is that this book sheds some light on how
to deal efﬁciently with the copyright/design interface so that no legislature
or court repeats the mistakes of the past. My less modest hope is that this
book has shown that solving the interface is not as difﬁcult and therefore as
utopian as it seems at ﬁrst sight.
125 See Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League v. QC
Leisure andKaren Murphy v.Media Protection Services [2011] ECR I-9083; Case C-393/
09, Bezpecÿnostní softwarová asociace–Svaz softwarové ochrany v. Ministerstvo kultury
[2011] ECDR 70; Painer, above, note 117; Case C-604/10, Football Dataco v. Yahoo
UK! [2012] 2 CMLR 24; Case C-406/10, SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd
[2012] 3 CMLR 4. On the CJEU case law on originality, see e.g. E. Rosati, ‘Originality
in a work, or a work of originality: The effects of the Infopaq decision’ (2011) EIPR 476;
I. Stamatoudi, ‘Originality under EU copyright law’, in P. Torremans (ed.), Copyright
Law: A Handbook of Contemporary Research, 2nd edn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2017), p. 57.
126 See the Nordic countries chapter, speaking of the EU.
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12.7 Annex: Graphs
Design Application and Registration Figures by Country
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
19
65
19
68
19
71
19
74
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
20
04
20
07
20
10
20
13
N
o.
 o
f A
pp
lic
at
io
ns
Australia: Split by Applicant Type
Total
Resident
Non-Resident
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Figure 12.5 Total number of design applications, Germany, split by
applicant type
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Greece: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.6 Total number of design applications, Greece, split by
applicant type
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Italy: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.7 Total number of design applications, Italy, split by applicant
type
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Japan: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.8 Total number of design applications, Japan, split by
applicant type
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EUIPO: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.9 Total number of design applications, EUIPO, split by
applicant type
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UK: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.10 Total number of design applications, UK, split by
applicant type
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USA: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.11 Total number of design applications, USA, split by
applicant type
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Denmark: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.12 Total number of design applications, Denmark, split by
applicant type
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Finland: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.13 Total number of design applications, Finland, split by
applicant type
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Sweden: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.15 Total number of design applications, Sweden, split by
applicant type
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Norway: Split by Applicant Type
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Figure 12.14 Total number of design applications, Norway, split by
applicant type
458 Estelle Derclaye
SA
MP
LE
